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Sustainable Professionalism
TREVOR C.W. FARROW *
This article challenges traditional visions of Lawyering by building on current alternative
narratives and articulating a new discourse of professionalism that is personally, politically,
ethically, economically, and professionally sustainable. It is a discourse that makes space for
lawyers' principles, interests, and life preferences by balancing them with other important
interests [including, but not dominated by, those of clients). It is a discourse that seeks to
make good on aspirational promises of equality, access to justice, and protecting the public
interest. And it is a discourse that takes seriously obligations to, as well as benefits from, the
culturally complicated makeup of the bar and pluralistic and g[obalized civil societies.
Cet article d6fie les perceptions traditionnelles de L'exercice.du droit, en mettant 6 profit
Les repr6sentations alternatives actuelles, et en formulant un nouveau discours de
professionnalisme viable du point de vue personnel, politique, 6thique, 6conomique et
professionneL. II s'agit dun discours qui tient compte des principes, int6rts et prefurences de
vie des avocats, en les 6quitibrant avec les autres int6r~ts importants (y compris, mais sans
qu'its dominent, les int6rts des clients]. It s'agit d'un discours qui cherche tenir Les
promesses aspirant 6 ['6galit6, 6 I'acc~s 6 [a justice et 6 [a protection des int6r~ts publics. Et iL
s'agit d'un discours qui prend au s6rieux les obligations-ainsi que Les avantages qui en
d6coulent-de ta composition culturellement compliqu6e du barreau, ainsi que des soci6t6s
civiles pluralistes et mondialis~es.
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Parts of this article were
first presented at two University of Toronto, Faculty of Law "Bridge Week" panels on legal
ethics and professionalism entitled "Conceptual Frameworks for Legal Ethics" (8 November
2006 and 7 November 2007); one chaired by the Honourable Mr. Justice Stephen Goudge
and the other by Lorne Sossin. I am grateful to my co-panelists-Randal Graham and Paul
Paton-together with Stephen Goudge, Lorne Sossin, and Michael Code for helpful
comments at those panels. This article has also benefited from numerous discussions with
Adam Dodek, Janet Mosher, Robert Wai, Rusby Chaparro, Graham Hudson, Stuart
O'Connell, and Mary Stokes in the context of creating Osgoode Hall Law School's new
"Ethical Lawyering in a Global Community" course, for which I am the course director. I
am grateful to Allan Hutchinson, Jamie Cameron, Adam Dodek, Alice Woolley, the
Osgoode Hall Law Journal student editorial board, and an anonymous reviewer for very
helpful comments and suggestions on an early draft of this article. Finally, I am also grateful
to Alan Melamud for excellent research assistance.
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Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make
it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found,
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like
a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in
revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in
such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their
service and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the
new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.1
[I]flauyers cannot look at the society as a whole and say that certain aspects of their work ...
represent a plus for this society and for the world of our children, then they had better look to
Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (1852) in Robert C. Tucker, ed.,
The Marx-Engels Reader, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978) 594 at 595 [Marx,
"Eighteenth Brumaire"]. I realize I am not the only one to see the instructive connections
between Marx's "Eighteenth Brumaire" and professionalism (see e.g. Anthony T. Kronman,
"Professionalism" (1999) 2 J.I.S.L.E. 89). 1 became aware of Kronman's use of Marx after
making my own connections on the issue.
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last-ditch defenses. Better yet, lawyers should try to finda way to salvage what is worth doing
out of their work and be influential in the production of what is going to happen next.2
THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE of the legal profession has run its course.
Lawyers are looking for ethically sensitive ways to practice law that "assume
greater responsibility for the welfare of parties other than clients"' and that
increasingly amount "to a plus for this society and for the world of our
children."' Lawyers are also seeking ways to practice law that allow them to get
home at night and on weekends, see their families, work full or part-time,
practice in diverse and "alternative" settings, and generally pursue a meaningful
career in the law rather than necessarily a total life in the law.5 Similarly, law
students are hoping not to be asked to make a "pact with the Devil"6 as the cost
of becoming a lawyer, and are instead looking to find areas in the law that fit
with their personal, political, and economic preferences! An increasing number
of legal academics are teaching, researching, and writing about progressive
changes to the way we view the role and purpose of lawyering.8 Law faculties
2. Martin Mayer, "The Trial Lawyers" in Grace W. Holmes, ed., Excellence in Advocacy
(Michigan: Ann Arbor, The Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1971) 51 at 60.
3. Deborah L. Rhode, "Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions" (2005-
2006) 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 641 at 649 [footnotes omitted] [Rhode, "Persistent Questions"].
See also David B. Wilkins, "Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from
Ideology in Legal Ethics," Book Review of The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession by Anthony T. Kronman (1994) 108 Harv. L. Rev. 458 at 472.
4. Mayer, supra note 2.
5. Trevor C.W. Farrow, "Law: A Profession, Not a Life" (2002) 26 Advocates' Q. 217 [Farrow,
"A Profession, Not a Life"].
6. Duncan Kennedy, "Rebels from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law Firm from Within"
(1981) Harv. L. Sch. Bull. 36 in Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the
Pervasive Method, 2d ed, (New York: Aspen, 1998) 86 at 87 [Kennedy, "Rebels from Principle"].
7. Much of my sense of law student preferences comes from countless direct discussions with
my students over the years. See also Sophie Bryan, "Personally Professional: A Law Student
in Search of an Advocacy Model" (2000) 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L; Rev. 277; Marilyn Poitras,
"Through My Eyes: Lessons on Life in Law School" (2005) 17 C.J.W.L. 41; and James R.
Elkins, "Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts" (1996) 47 Mercer L. Rev. 511.
8. See e.g. Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Irwin, 2006) [Hutchinson, Legal Ethics]; Rhode, "Persistent Questions," supra note 3 at
643. For a very useful discussion on trends in Canadian academic scholarship in the area
of legal ethics and professionalism, see Adam M. Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready
for the Twenty-First Century at Last" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 [Dodek, "Canadian
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are actively reforming their programs and creating centres and initiatives designed
to make space for innovative ethics offerings and public interest programs.' Law
societies and other regulatory bodies are slowly chipping away at some of the
time-honoured shields of ethically suspect client behaviour,"0 while at the same
time facing demands for increased accountability." The bench and the bar are
taking an active interest in addressing a perceived growing lack of professionalism
within the practice. 2 The public is increasingly skeptical of the distinction that
continues to be drawn between legal ethics and "ordinary standards of moral
conduct."' 3 Finally, clients are not only expecting lawyers to actively canvass
methods of alternative dispute resolution-the alternative to the adversarial and
Legal Ethics"]. Further, there is a newly formed Canadian network of ethics scholars (of
which I am a member) that is supported by the law school deans and that is currently
seeking to create a Canadian Virtual Center for Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
See also Part III.B.
9. See e.g. Osgoode Hall Law School, "Ethical Lawyering in a Global Community" course,
online: <http://osgoode.yorku.calQuickPlace/trevorfarrow/PageLibrary852573410062FA
FO.nsf/h Toc/92be13faecl b583905256708001672381!OpenDocument> ["Ethical
Lawyering"]; Osgoode Public Interest Requirement Program, "First Year Degree
Requirements," online: <http://www.osgoode. yorku.ca/llb/first-year..requirements.html>.
See also Harvard Law School, "Program on the Legal Profession," online: <http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/plp/>; University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, "Centre for
Professionalism, Ethics and Public Service," online: <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty-
content.asp? itemPath= 1/9/12/0/0&contentld= 1602&cType=webpages>.
10. In the US, see e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 307, § 7245 (2003); 17 C.F.R.
205.3 (2005), which is discussed further in Rhode, "Persistent Questions," supra note 3 at
647-48. See also Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, "Lawyers, Ethics and Enron" (2002) 8
Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 9. In Canada, see e.g. Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of
Professional Conduct (adopted 1 November 2000, as amended), r. 2.02 (1.1), (5)-(5.2)
[LSUC, Rules]. See also Paul D. Paton, "Corporate Counsel as Corporate Conscience: Ethics
and Integrity in the Post-Enron Era" (2006) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 533; Paul D. Paton, "The
Independence of the Bar and the Public Interest Imperative: Lawyers as Gatekeepers,
Whistleblowers, or Instruments of State Enforcement?" in LSUC, In the Public Interest
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 175.
1I. See e.g. Rhode, "Persistent Questions," supra note 3 at 657-58.
12. See e.g. Chief Justice of Ontario's Advisory Committee on Professionalism, online:
<http://www.lsuc.on.callatest-news/alhottopicslcommittee-on-professionalism/>.
13. Samuel Dash, "Legal Ethics and Morality: Can a Legally Ethical Lawyer Be a Moral Person?"
(1993) 1 Frank G. Raichle Lecture Series on Law in American Society 209 at 212; also at 214.
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costly litigation process-but they are also demanding evidence of general
sustainable professional practices from their legal counsel."
These current, contextual, and contested realities have become badges of
modern progressive lives in the practice of law, as well as its visions. Taken
together, they are forming a new discourse for lawyers and the legal profession
that is seeking to become personally, politically, ethically, economically, and
professionally sustainable. It is a discourse that makes meaningful space for a
lawyer's own principles, interests, and life preferences by balancing them with
other important interests-including, but not dominated by, those of the
client-in the context of the overall calculus of what counts as the "right"
course of conduct both in a given retainer as well as, more generally, in a given
career.1" It is a discourse that seeks to make good on what has largely only
amounted to aspirational promises of equality, access to justice, and the
protection of the public interest. And it is a discourse that seeks both to benefit
from and take seriously its obligations to address the culturally complicated
makeup of the bar and our general pluralistic and globalized civil societies.
This modern discourse of an ethically sustainable profession challenges the
"time-honoured"' 6 centrality of client autonomy and a lawyer's unqualified
loyalty to the client's interests. Specifically, it rejects stories of lawyers,
collectively, as members of a relatively homogenized profession and who,
individually, are single-tasked "hired guns" focused on only one interest "in.
all the world."'" According to this new model, those stories are no longer-if
they ever were-sustainable.
14. See e.g. Pamela McClintock, "Big Corporate Clients Demand Diversity" (1999) 221:99
N.Y.L.J. 5.
15. I have elsewhere commented on the relevance of some of these competing interests,
particularly in the context of negotiation and in advocacy. See e.g. Trevor C.W. Farrow,
"The Negotiator-as-Professional: Understanding the Competing Interests of a Representative
Negotiator" (2007) 7 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 373 [Farrow, "The Negotiator-as-
Professional"]; Trevor C.W. Farrow, "Representative Negotiation" in Colleen M. Hanycz,
Trevor C.W. Farrow & Frederick H. Zemans, eds., The Theory and Practice of Representative
Negotiation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) c. 2; and Trevor C.W. Farrow, "Ethics in
Advocacy" in Alice Woolley, Brent Cotter & John Law, eds., Professional Responsibility in
Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis) c. 3 [forthcoming in 2008] (Farrow, "Ethics in Advocacy"].
16. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
17. See Trial of Queen Caroline, infra note 68. See generally, below, Part II.
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Thinking about the profession in terms of a discourse of "professional
sustainability" that takes seriously a broad range of voices and interests is
surprisingly new. The label "sustainable" has not, to date, been generally
applied to discussions of ethics and professionalism in the legal context.18 And
because as a profession, lawyers are still "anxiously" fearful of replacing the
spirits" of "dead generations," which continue to weigh on us "like a
nightmare" 9 (lawyers grow up and depend on stories of zeal, vigour, and role-
differentiated behaviour" that allow them to act for all kinds of clients,
including those who they think are "reprehensible,"21 while still being able to
sleep soundly at night), a discourse of sustainable professionalism is threatening.
Proponents of the dominant model borrow "names, battle slogans, and
costumes": 22 names such as "zealous advocates," 2 "shock troops, '' 21 "hired
gun[s]," 2' and "soldiers of the law"; 26 battle slogans such as "fierce," "fearless,"
"resolute," and "partisan";27 and costumes such as barristers' gowns, tabs, and
waistcoats. They doggedly and dogmatically 2' re-make a history under this
18. See further note 196 and surrounding text.
19. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
20. For a discussion of role-differentiated behaviour (a behavioural approach that "often makes it
both appropriate and desirable for the person in a particular role to put to one side
considerations of various sorts-and especially various moral considerations-that would
otherwise be relevant if not decisive"), see Richard Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals:
Some Moral Issues" (1975) 5 Hum. Rts. 1 at 3 [Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals"].
21. From Gary Mason, "'A rigorous defence ... is the key to our system"' The Globe and Mail
(11 December 2007) A15 [Mason].
22. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
23. Richard A. Matasar, "The Pain of Moral Lawyering" (1990) 75 Iowa L. Rev. 975 at 975. See
also R. v. Felderhof (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 481 at para. 84 (C.A.), Rosenberg J.A. Compare
American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (adopted 1983, as amended)
at Preamble and Scope, para. 2 [ABA, Model Rules].
24. Matasar, ibid. at 975.
25. See e.g. Rob Atkinson, "A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade" (1995)
74 Tex. L. Rev. 259 at 304; David M. Tanovich, "Law's Ambition and the Reconstruction
of Role Morality in Canada" (2005) 28 Dal. L.J. 267 at 271.
26. Matasar, supra note 23 at 985.
27. See e.g. R. v. Felderhof supra note 23 at para. 85; LSUC, Rules, supra note 10 at r. 4.01 (1)
and commentary; and Canadian Bar Association, Code ofProfessional Conduct (adopted
August 2004 and February 2006), c. IX [CBA, Code].
28. For a useful treatment of the deployment of dogmatic language in the service of sustaining
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"time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language" 9 in a continued effort to
"create[] a world after [their] image."3
The resulting paradox created by the dominant narrative is that, although
the stories that continue to be told are becoming less attractive to more
people,31 the stories continue to be told. To my mind, given the complex
realities of the current professional trajectory," lawyers need another story-a
sustainable story-that captures those complex realities and provides for a
meaningful prospect of broad-based buy-in. Alternative models that critique
the dominant model provide another story.33 Those critiques, which are
becoming increasingly attractive, are often framed in terms of the "moral
perspective, "3  "moral lawyering,"3  "the moral lawyer,"3 or "the good
lawyer."37 These labels appear to connote some shared or required
understanding of what counts as "moral" or "good," whereas the safe
harbours of zealous advocacy and neutral partisanship 38 provide sheltered,
role-differentiated moral refuge, and continue to be preferred over alternative
accounts. Further, these alternative models are typically criticized for
legal traditions-specifically in the context of solicitor-client privilege-see Adam M.
Dodek, "Theoretical Foundations of Solicitor-Client Privilege" [unpublished].
•29. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
30. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party" (1848) [Marx &
Engels, "Communist Manifesto"] in Tucker, •supra note 1 at 477.
31. I realize that, although correct in my view, this statement is not uncontroversial. For
example, many clients (and indeed many lawyers) are quite happy with the current model.
See Part IIC, below, for more on this topic.
32. See e.g. supra notes 3-14.
33. See Part III, below, for further discussion of these alternatives. See also Jerome E.
Bickenbach, "The Redemption of the Moral Mandate of the Profession of Law" (1996) 9
Can. J.L. & Jut. 51.
34. See e.g. Robert K. Vischer, "Legal Advice as Moral Perspective" (2006) 19 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 225.
35. See e.g. Matasar, supra note 23.
36. See e.g. Hon. Frank lacobucci, "The Practice of Law: Business and Professionalism" (1991)
49 Advocate 859 at 863.
37. See e.g. David Luban, ed., The Good Lauyer. Lawyers'Roles and Layers' Ethics (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983); Richard Wasserstrom, "Legal Education and the Good
Lawyer" (1984) 34 J. Legal Educ. 155 [Wasserstrom, "Legal Education"].
38. See e.g. infra note 66 and surrounding text.
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underplaying the institutional value of the lawyer in the adversarial system,
while at the same time overplaying the relevance or supremacy of the lawyer's
individual moral choices or preferences that risk usurping the ethical
autonomy of the lawyer's client.39
In my experience, while some students and practitioners40 are in optimistic
agreement with modern critiques, most are, at worst, put off by them and are,
at best, intrigued but ultimately not persuaded by their apparent moral
superiority, relativity, and sermon-like4 1 nature. For example, I recently taught a
series of mandatory first year legal ethics seminars. 2 One of the early classes
took up the relevance of a lawyer's sense of self-moral values; social and
political views; sense of societal duty, justice, and world outlook; space for
personal obligations to family, friends, and other commitments; obligations to
work colleagues, institutional preferences, and duties; expectations of equality
and progressive workplace experiences; et cetera-in the context of a life in the
law, and more specifically, in the context of the lawyer-client advocacy model. I
asked the twenty-five students in the seminar to put their hands up if, ideally,
they would like to maintain a meaningful sense and space for "self' after
becoming lawyers (i.e., whether the profession should be able to accommodate
and sustain that sense of self). Approximately twenty-five hands went up. I then
asked the same students to put their hands up if they thought creating that
space could actually occur "in the real world" of practising lawyers. No hands
went up. Of course this informal in-class exercise was neither scientific nor
comprehensive. The reaction was, however, consistent with numerous other
legal ethics classes in which I have asked the same and similar questions, and
with accounts of other student experiences as well.43 The reaction tells me that,
39. See Part I.A-B, below, for more on this topic.
40. My comments here are animated by several experiences: approximately five years as a
litigation lawyer at a large firm in Toronto, approximately seven years of teaching ethics and
professionalism to LL.B. students in several different institutions in several different
jurisdictions, and more recently, teaching also in a part-time graduate program in which
most students typically continue to carry on an active law practice.
41. Rob Atkinson, "How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of the
Remains of the Day" (1995) 105 Yale L.J. 177 at 177 [Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism"].
42. See "Ethical Lawyering," supra note 9.
43. See e.g. Kennedy, "Rebels from Principle," supra note 6 at 87 ("I think we should ask of our
students that in practice they try to figure out whether there are intelligent, more or less
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even at the outset of law school, at least some students-and my intuition is
that in fact most students-already have a strongly developed sense of
allegiance to the institutional history and hegemonic ideology of the practice of
law. As such, they are already starting to "think like a lawyer."" Clearly the
"spirits of the past" have a firm hold on the "brain[s] of the living.""
This article seeks to demystify the power of those spirits by providing a
new way to think about professionalism." Specifically, by tapping into and
building upon the ideas and energy of many current alternative models of
professionalism, I seek to assist with the project of re-conceiving our modern
understanding of professionalism. It is a professionalism that, unlike traditional
(dominant) accounts, makes descriptive and normative sense of the complex
modern practice of law. In so doing, I do not claim to be making a radical
departure from other alternative model thinkers. In fact, what this article does
is simply to recalibrate many of the current (primarily alternative) models and
discussions through a slightly different lens: that of sustainability.
To frame the overall discussion, Part I provides a brief discussion of the
meaning and import of legal ethics and professionalism. Part II reviews some of
the relevant history of the traditional model of lawyering that continues to
dominate the modern discourse of legal professionalism. Part III canvasses
several alternative visions of the profession that critique the dominant model.
Part IV, collectively building on a number of those alternative visions, seeks to
assist with the development of a sustainable discourse of professionalism.
I. LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM
This article does not purport to provide a full treatment of the study of ethics
generally, or even of legal ethics in particular. A brief understanding of what I
mean by ethics and professionalism provides a context for my underlying
controlled risks they can take to put their careers behind their opinions. According to my
students, they 'impliedly agreed' not to do any such thing, and if they tried, they'd be fired,
or never make partner").
44. See e.g. Elkins, supra note 7.
45. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
46. With apologies to Marx and Engels, it could be said that what I am recognizing is the "spectre"
that is currently "haunting" the legal profession: the spectre of sustainable professionalism. See
Marx & Engels, "Communist Manifesto," supra note 30 at 473.
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arguments. As a starting point, the concept of ethics invites notions of good
and bad as values in themselves, from either the perspective of semantics or of
justification. "7 These perspectives of ethical theory are not immediately
interested in the application of ethical thinking to specific contexts of human
action. 8 G.E. Moore, for example, explained that his approach to the topic of
ethics recognizes the distinction between an underlying value itself-namely
"the general enquiry into what is good"-and an evaluation of the human
action that is derivative from that underlying value. 9
For the purposes of this article, my interest in ethics (and in particular legal
ethics)-animated in part by Plato's dialogue on just conduct in the
Republic5-is at the level of human action in context. Because this article is
concerned with the derivative discussion of ethics as applied to the legal
profession, my approach here adopts this derivative standpoint.51 What is "at
47. Although ethicists often think of these perspectives as the subjects more specifically of either
meta-ethics or normative ethics, this distinction does not matter for the purposes of this article (a
distinction that, in any event, is at least for some "no longer found so convincing or important"
(Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1985)
73)). However, for a useful discussion on the basic differences between these sub-streams of
ethics, see at c. 5. See also Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, supra note 6 at 12.
48. That perspective is often thought of as the purview of applied ethics. See e.g. Rhode, ibid. at 12.
49. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903) at 2.
50. Plato, "The Republic," Bk. I, 352d in The Dialogues of Plato, 3d ed., trans. by B. Jowett
(London: Oxford University Press, 1931) vol. 1 at 33 [Plato, trans. by Jowett]. My thinking
on the use of Plato's Republic in this part of the article has been influenced by Bernard
Williams. See Williams, supra note 47 at c. 1.
51. Although choosing Plato's more metaphysical treatment of justice as a convenient underlying
conceptual starting point, a different lens through which to think about legal ethics could be
the lens of pragmatism, developed by thinkers such as William James, John Dewey, and
more recently Richard Rorty (see e.g. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)). For example, rather than trying to
philosophize about legal ethics and professional responsibility in the context of abstract
notions of "the good," pragmatists would be much more likely to consider the discussion's
practical applications for lawyers and clients (and other interested stakeholders) in the
specific context of their everyday roles and experiences. This viewpoint might be helpful
when trying to develop an understanding of professionalism-particularly from the
contextual perspective of sustainability-that is contemplated in this article. However,
because nothing in this article turns on my choice of conceptual lenses, I leave this as a point
of departure for* future fruitful thinking on ethics and professionalism. For a useful
discussion of the distinction between Plato's general philosophical approach and pragmatism,
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stake" in this discussion-as Socrates contemplated in his musings with
Thrasymachus about the lives of the just and unjust-is "no light matter." 2
Ethics, from this perspective, involves an inquiry into "how one should live
one's life" 3 or "the rule of human life."
5 4
When thinking about the subset of ethics that we call legal ethics, the
starting point for the inquiry is to think about how one should live in the
context of law, or more specifically, how lawyers ought to act in the context of.
the profession. To push this discussion further, I turn to Aristotle, who in his
discussion on community-and in particular the telos (end) of the community
of the polis (city)-argued that the city exists not only "for the sake of living, it
exists for the sake of living well." 5 If we then think of the legal profession as the
(self-regulated) community in which we are ultimately contemplating (and
judging) the ethics of a lawyer's action, the legal profession must exist not only
for the sake of practising law, but for the sake of practising it well. Any notion
of legal ethics must therefore contemplate an understanding of lawyering that is
fully engaged with a vision of what amounts to practising well.
We need to find a way of deciding what amounts to "practising well."
Religion, custom, power, and happiness have all been used over the centuries by
ethicists to assess the general morality of a given course of action.56 In the
see e.g. Richard Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1982) at xiii ff. ("Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy"). See generally Williams,
supra note 47 at 137-38; Charles Taylor, PhilosophicalArguments (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995) at 2 ff. I am grateful to Allan Hutchinson for comments on the
application of pragmatism to this project.
52. Plato, trans. by Jowett, supra note 50.
53. Plato, The Republic, Bk. I, 352d, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993) at 40.
54. Plato, trans. by Jowett, supra note 50.
55. Aristotle, The Politics, Bk. 1, c. 2, 1252b, trans. by Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984) at 37.
56. For useful background sources, see e.g. Donald Nicholson & Julian Webb, ProfessionalLegal
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) c. 2; J.B. Schneewind, "Modern Moral
Philosophy" in Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991)
147; and R.M. Hare, The Language ofMorals (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). See
further Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2d ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002); George H. Sabine, A History ofPolitical Theory (London:
George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1948); Philippa Foot, ed., Theories ofEthics (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967); J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth,
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specific context of law we might consider the "legality" of a given course of
conduct-the client's conduct-and ask Rob Atkinson's "fundamental
question of professional ethics": "Should a professional always do all that the
law allows, or should the professional recognize other constraints, particularly
concerns for the welfare of third parties?""7 According to Atkinson, this
question "divides scholars of legal ethics ... into two schools: those who
recognize constraints other than law's outer limit, and those who do not." 8 The
next two parts of this article look at the leading (and competing) approaches to
thinking about Atkinson's "fundamental question. ""
Finally, the term "legal ethics" is typically used interchangeably with the
term "professionalism" or "professional responsibility."6 The sources for what
counts as right or wrong for the purposes of these interchangeable approaches
to ethics and/or professionalism are found in codes of professional conduct and
other legal texts.6 This interchangeable approach does not typically pose a
problem. Often ethics and professionalism map nicely onto one another. For
example, it is generally agreed that stealing from a client or acting in a direct
financial conflict with a client are bad things, both from the perspective of
professional codes and from the perspective of personal morality. However,
UK: Penguin Books Ltd., 1977); and W.D. Hudson, Modern MoralPhilosophy, 2d ed.
(London: MacMillan, 1983).
57. Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41 at 184 [footnotes omitted].
58. Ibid. For a similar analysis, see Vischer, supra note 34 at 227. Compare William H. Simon,
"Visions of Practice in Legal Thought" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 at 469.
59. A potential objection to using Atkinson's "fundamental question" to frame this part of the
discussion is that often what counts as "legal" is not necessarily something that is neatly
separate and apart from lawyers and their ethical deliberation and professional involvement.
In fact, lawyers are typically very much bound up in the production of law and its procedural
instruments. However, because this is more of an objection to the premise of Atkinson's
question than an objection to my use of his question (which, ultimately-as is developed
further in this article in Part IV.A-D-is sympathetic to this objection), I do not need to
respond to it further here. For a discussion of the concerns that underline this potential
objection, see e.g. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics, supra note 8 at 26.
60. See e.g. Nathan M. Crystal, Professional Responsibility: Problems of Practice and the Profession,
2d ed. (New York: Aspen, 2000) at 9 ("Professional responsibility or legal ethics, like other
fields of law, is a latticework of court rules, judicial decisions, statutes, and other
authorities"). See also Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics, 5th
ed. (New York: Aspen, 1998) at 10-13.
61. See e.g. Crystal, ibid. at 9.
FARROW, SUSTAINABLE PROFESSIONALISM 63
because codes of conduct are often open textured in approach and indefinite in
content, what any given individual considers to be "professional" can depend
on personal moral deliberation as to what counts as "ethical." As will be seen,
6 2
it is therefore important to maintain the conceptual distinction between what is
professional, under codes of conduct, and what is ethical, as ultimately guided
by personal moral deliberation.63
II. DOMINANT MODEL OF PROFESSIONALISM
One approach to Atkinson's "fundamental question" is provided by the
traditional and still dominant view of the lawyer's role. Familiar labels such as
"zealous advocate,"6" "amoral technician," and "neutral partisan"" are used to
describe this hegemonic model of lawyering. In a nutshell, the basic defining
elements of this narrative are that the lawyer's job is to advance zealously the
client's cause with all legal means; to be personally neutral vis-a-vis the result of
the client's cause; and to leave the ultimate ethical, personal, economic, and
social bases for the decision to proceed in the hands of the client. According to
this view, lawyers should reject non-legal factors such as morality, popularity,
religion, power, custom, etc. and be guided only by what the law allows,
thereby viewing themselves purely as legal agents for their clients.
Perhaps the "spirit[] of the past" that is most often "conjure[d] up"67 in
defence of this dominant model is that of Henry Brougham who, in defence of
Queen Caroline against adultery charges brought by her husband King George
IV, famously argued that a lawyer "knows but one person in all the world, and
62. See Part IV.C, below.
63. For useful background discussion on professional regulation and legal ethics, see e.g. Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978) cc. 1-
2; Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline, 4th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 2006) at 2-3.
64. See e.g. Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers'Ethics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1975) at 9-24.
65. See e.g. Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals," supra note 20 at 6.
66. See e.g. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests ofJustice: Reforming the Legal Profession (Okford:
Oxford University Press, 2000) at 53 [Rhode, Interests ofJustice]; Atkinson, "Perverted
Professionalism," supra note 41 at 185 [footnotes omitted].
67. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
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that person is his client. '68 However, lest we think that this is a vision and
language of old, the same words continue to be used by modern legal ethics
scholars. 69 As David Layton has commented, the "dominant view is everywhere
in Canadian law."" This dominant vision of the lawyer's role is premised on
well-established arguments sounding in principle, policy, and practice. The
model is also well represented in visions of lawyers as portrayed in literature,
popular culture, and the media.
A. PRINCIPLE
The animating principle behind the dominant position-consistent with
enlightenment notions of individual autonomy and freedom-is one that
champions a client's freedom to arrange her affairs within the bounds of the
law.71 According to Atkinson, "[s]ociety recognizes individual autonomy as a
good in the highest order ... and carves out a sphere in which individuals can
exercise that autonomy without interference. By helping lay folk ... the lawyer
is accomplishing a moral and social, not just professional, good." 2 The lawyer's
job, therefore, is to. facilitate "the client's exercise of moral autonomy as
68. Lord Brougham further commented, regarding the advocate's role, that "(t]o save that client
by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them,
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the
alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others." J. Nightingale, ed.,
Trial of Queen Caroline, vol. 2 (London: J. Robins & Co., 1821) at 8 [ Trial of Queen
Caroline]. See also Farrow, "Ethics in Advocacy," supra note 15.
69. See e.g. Dash, supra note 13 ("A lawyer knows but one person, his client" at 217). See
generally Freedman, supra note 64 at 9.
70. David Layton, "The Criminal Defence Lawyer's Role" (2004) 27 Dal. L.J. 379 at 381.
71. See e.g. Stephen L. Pepper, "The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities" (1986) Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 613 at 616-18, 626-27; Charles Fried,
"The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation" (1976) 85
Yale L.J. 1060 at 1073-74, 1077.
72. Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41 at 187-88. As such, when
proponents of neutral partisanship describe their model as amoral, they are not referring to its
ultimate grounding, w ich is emphatically moral. They are referring, rather, to the lawyer's
immunity from the task of scrutinizing the morality of particular client acts. Theirs is the morality
at the wholesale but not the retail level; a morality of the long run, not the particular case; a
morality of fidelity to role obligationS, not attention to particular acts.
(at 188) [footnotes omitted].
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authorized by the law."" Lawyers as champions of client freedom militate
against a tyranny of th majority or of the executive (in line with de Tocqueville's
observations about lawyers"5), which is particularly important in the context of
a legal profession that essentially has a monopoly over the provision of increasingly
complicated and necessary legal services." Any other role for the lawyer would
usurp the role not just of judge and jury, but of the legislature as well."76
Justifications for the dominant narrative also come from the fact that,
particularly-although not exclusively-in the criminal law context, clients
deserve the best defence and representation possible, especially when they are
up against the power of the state and individual liberty is involved." Further,
according to Lon Fuller, the purpose of a rule of professional conduct that
makes it proper to defend a criminal, including one whom the lawyer knows to
be guilty, "is to preserve the integrity of society itself. It aims at keeping sound
and wholesome the procedures by which society visits its condemnation on an
erring member." 8 The criminal law context therefore provides the strongest
justification for the dominant model,79 even though a minority of lawyers
73. Ibid. at 187 [footnotes omitted].
74. See e.g. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, J.P. Mayer, ed., trans. by George
Lawrence (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) c. 8 at 263-70.
75. See Stephen L. Pepper, "A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban" (1986) Am. Bar
Found. Res. J. 657.
76. Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41 at 189. See also Wasserstrom, "Lawyers
as Professionals," supra note 20 at 10. For useful background discussions of the dominant
model, see e.g. William H. Simon, "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering" (1988) 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1083 at 1084-90 [Simon, "Ethical Discretion"]; Sharon Dolovich, "Ethical Lawyering
and the Possibility of Integrity" (2002) 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1629 at 1632-39; Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode, The Legal Profession: Responsibility and Regulation, 3d ed.
(Westbury: Foundation Press, 1994) at 135-213; and Vischer, supra note 34 at 226-27.
Compare also Leonard Riskin's critique of the traditional lawyer's "standard philosophical
map." Leonard Riskin, "Mediation and Lawyers" (1982) 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29 at 44.
77. See e.g. Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals," supra note 20 at 7-8.
78. Lon L. Fuller, "The Adversary System" in Harold J. Berman, ed., Talks on American Law
(New York: Vintage Books, 1961) at 32-37.
79. For this reason, the dominant model's treatment of the criminal defence lawyer is also the
most difficult aspect of the dominant model to critique. In fact, there is a debate in the
alternative literature about whether the alternative models, discussed further in Part III,
apply equally to criminal defence work as they do to civil side work. For example,
Wasserstrom argues that "the amoral behaviour of the criminal defense lawyer is justifiable,"
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practises criminal law."0 Finally, the institutional setting of the adversary system
requires that all participants-specifically including lawyers-"adhere to their
institutional roles."81 The dependability and predictability of the adversary
system relies on the amorality of the participating advocates.82
B. POLICY
These animating principles and justifications for the dominant narrative have
been embodied in numerous sources of policy, most notably including various
codes of professional conduct. Perhaps one of the strongest modern policy
statements is found in the ABA's Model Rules, which provide that when acting
as an advocate, "a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of
the adversary system."83 Similarly in Canada, the CBA's Code provides that
and is of the view that "[o]nce we leave the peculiar situation of the criminal defense lawyer
... it is quite likely that the role-differentiated amorality of the lawyer is almost certainly
excessive and at times inappropriate." Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals," supra note 20
at 12 [emphasis in original]. See similarly Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 72
(arguing that the criminal context often requires role differentiated behaviour); David
Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) at
148 (arguing that, in the criminal defence context, "the appeal to the adversary system by-
and-large vindicates the kind of partisan zeal characterized in the standard conception")
[Luban, Lawyers and Justice]. See further Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note
41 at 191. In contrast, William Simon rejects the distinction between civil and criminal
contexts as a reason to move away from the notion of justice-seeking as the basis for ethical
deliberation. See William Simon, The Practice ofJustice: A Theory ofLayers'Ethics
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) at 170-94, discussed in Dolovich, supra note
76 at 1647-48.
80. See e.g. ABA Young Lawyers Division, Survey, "Career Satisfaction Among Young Lawyers"
(2000) at 13 (table 11), online: ABA <http://www.abanet.org/yld/satisfaction_800.doc>.
81. Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals," supra note 20 at 9-10.
82. Ibid. at 10. See also Wasserstrom, "Legal Education," supra note 37 at 157-58; Abe Krash,
"Professional Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest: Is There a Conflict?" (1974)
55 Chicago Bar Record 31. For an early and colourful account of this role-based institutional
argument, see James Boswell, Boswell's Journal ofA Tour to the Hebrides with SamuelJohnson,
LL.D. (London: William Heinemann, 1936) at 14-15 (15 August 1773 journal entry).
83. ABA, Model Rules, supra note 23. For commentary, see e.g. Alice Woolley, "Integrity in
Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the Canadian and American Lawyer"
(1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Jut. 61 [Woolley, "Integrity in Zealousness"].
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when acting as an advocate, "the lawyer must ... represent the client resolutely,
honourably and within the limits of the law."'
In the spirit of the dominant model's commitment to amorality, these
policy provisions recognize the importance of the lawyer's ability to raise
arguments that, while legal, may not be popular (or moral"5). For example, the
LSUC's Rules provide that the lawyer "has a duty to the client to raise fearlessly
every issue, advance every argument, and ask every question, however distastejul,
that the lawyer thinks will help the client's case, and endeavour to obtain for
the client the benefit of every remedy and defence authorized by law."86
Further, in line with the principles of the dominant- model, even if the
lawyer has personal difficulties with the position of the client, the dominant
model requires the lawyer to suppress his or her own views in favour of those of
the client and to "refrain from expressing the lawyer's personal opinions on the
merits of a client's case. "" Alberta makes the same point even more bluntly:
"What the lawyer believes about the merits of the case is essentially irrelevant.""8
C. PRACTICE
Finally, not only do the principles of the dominant model play out in the
guiding policy statements in the area, they also resonate with the routine
practice of most lawyers' daily work. One only needs briefly to visit the local
civil or criminal courts to see the model in action.89 The model is equally
present in the context of everyday solicitor work, including real estate deals,
estate matters, corporate and securities work, tax planning, et cetera.9" In sum,
the dominant model is not only the dominant model in theory, it also
continues to be the dominant model in practice.
84. CBA, Code, supra note 27.
85. For example, according to Wasserstrom, the dominant model has been described as
rendering lawyers "at best systematically amoral and at worst more than occasionally
immoral in his or her dealings with the rest of mankind." Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as
Professionals," supra note 20 at 1.
86. LSUC, Rules, supra note 10, r. 4.01(1), commentary [emphasis added].
87. Ibid.
88. The Law Society of Alberta, Code ofProfessional Conduct, c. 10, r. 11, commentary [LSA, Code].
89. See e.g. Mason, supra note 21.
90. Discussed in Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals," supra note 20 at 8. In the specific
context of representative negotiation, see e.g. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., "Legal Representation
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D. LITERATURE, POPULAR CULTURE, AND MEDIA
We also see the realities of legal practice playing themselves out in the ways that
lawyers are portrayed in literature, film, popular culture, and the media. From
before Shakespeare to after Shaw, lawyers continue to be viewed in literature
primarily through the lens of amorality and by the choices and actions that
result from that amoral viewpoint." For example, as Jean-Baptiste Clamence,
the narrator and former successful Parisian lawyer in Camus' La Chute (The
Fall) mused: "Now and then I still argued a case. At times even, forgetting that
I no longer believed in what I was saying, I was a good advocate."92
Representations of lawyers in movies and other popular culture venues continue
with this tendency.93 For example, for fans of Law & Order, there is no doubt
that Jack McCoy's views that "justice is a by-product of winning" and that
"sometimes you have to make deals with the devil" separate the attorney's
personal morals from the client's causes."C The media also regularly highlight
the ethical challenges of lawyers9" as well as normalize or romanticize the role of
and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow
the Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation" (1990) 47 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 819.
91. For general treatments of law and literature, see e.g. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature, rev.
ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Irving Browne, Law and Lawyers in
Literature (Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman, 1982); John Marshall Gest, The Lawyer in
Literature (Boston: Boston Book Company, 1913). For a useful Canadian collection of papers
and discussions on the topic of law and literature, see The Honourable Mr. Justice James M.
Farley, "Law, Lawyers and Judges in Literature" (The Chief Justice of Ontario's Advisory
Committee on Professionalism, Sixth Colloquium on the Legal Profession: Law and Lawyers in
Literature and Film, 10 March 2006), online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/latest-news/a/hottopics/
committee-on-professionalism/papers-from-past-colloquia>.
92. Albert Camus, The Fall,.trans. by Justin O'Brien (London: Penguin, 2000) at 79 [emphasis
added]. See also Boswell's recounting of Johnson's views on the role of the lawyer, supra note 82.
93. For a recent and compelling film that looks at various competing visions of lawyers' professional
and ethical roles and obligations, see Michael Clayton (Warner Bros. Pictures, 2007), online:
Warner Bros. <http://michaelclayton.warnerbros.com/#>. See further Paul Bergman, "The
Movie Lawyers' Guide to Redemptive Legal Practice" in Susan D. Carle, ed., Lawyers'Ethics
and the Pursuit of Social Justice (New York: New York University Press, 2005) at 309.
94. The Internet Movie Database ("IMDb"), "Memorable Quotes from 'Law & Order' (1990),"
online: <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098844/quotes>.
95. See e.g. Kate Fillion, "'One prominent lawyer told me, "Every lawyer is going to go into the
office today and commit fraud." Then he laughed.' Ex-Bay Street lawyer Philip Slayton talks
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the zealous advocate.96 Either way, the dominant message is delivered and
perpetuated both inside and outside of the profession.
E. HEGEMONY LIGHT
If the client's interests were truly all that was at stake for an advocate, as the
purest of zealous advocacy models proposes, his or her job would be relatively
straightforward: there would only be, in line with Lord Brougham's
articulation, "one person in all the world."97 Most versions of the dominant
model, however, do not focus solely on the zealous representation of the client.
First, lawyers-no matter how zealous-cannot engage in illegal activity by, for
example, concealing evidence or obstructing justice.98 This view is consistent
with typical code of conduct provisions requiring lawyers to act "within the
limits of the law." 99
Second, although slightly more controversial, most dominant trend
theorists typically recognize and make space for a lawyer's obligations to the
court.' For example, according to Florida State Judge David A. Demers of the
Sixth Judicial Circuit for St. Petersburg, the "best definition" of professionalism
balances "two primary duties: (1) zealous representation ... and (2) service as an
to Kate Fillion about how lawyers became greedy, unprincipled enablers of the rich,"
Maclean's 120:30 (6 August 2007) 18 (the "Lawyers are Rats" issue). This was an interview
with Philip Slayton, based on his recent book: Philip Slayton, Lauyers Gone Bad: Money, Sex
and Madness in Canada's Legal Profession (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007). See similarly
James L. Kelley, Lawyers Crossing Lines: Nine Stories (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic
Press, 2001). For a brief discussion of the Maclean's issue and Philip Slayton's book, see
Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics," supra note 8 at 7, 16, 38. For a review of Slayton's book,
see Lorraine Lafferty, (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 197; Tim Wilbur, "The trouble with law
is lawyers" The Globe andMail (4 August 2007) D3. For a recent example of media attention
on a particularly ethically contentious legal issue, see Adam Liptak, "Lawyer Reveals Secret,
Toppling Death Sentence" The New York Times (19 January 2008), online:
•<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/us/ 19death.html?pagewanted= 1>.
96. See e.g. Mason, supra note 21 (discussing the role of Peter Ritchie and other members of the
defence team in the Robert Pickton murder trial); Liptak, ibid.; and Wilbur, ibid. (stating
that the "accepted view in the profession" is that "a lawyer should be a zealous advocate...").
97. Trial of Queen Caroline, supra note 68.
98. Freedman, supra note 64 at 6; Fried, supra note 71 at 1080-82.
99. See e.g. CBA, Code, supra note 27.
100. See e.g. Freedman, supra note 64 at 9-24.
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officer of the court. 1. 1 What counts as service "to the court" is a contested
discussion. One less controversial version of this service would be the relatively
narrow and negative obligations not to, for example, "deceive a tribunal,"
"misstate the contents of a document [or] the testimony of a witness," or
"dissuade a witness from giving evidence."" 2 However, given that the privilege
of self-regulation has come with the responsibility of acting in the public
interest," 3 acting as an officer of the court has been seen by some to include
more expansive notions of lawyering responsibilities that potentially are
required by the public interest.' These more expansive notions are captured in
code provisions that require lawyers to temper their zeal and act not only
"within the limits of the law" but also "honourably"' 5 and by discharging "all
responsibilities to ... the public."106
However, but for understandings of what counts as acting "honourably"
that include visions of the advocate as giving their "entire devotion to the interests
of the client,"107 or as acting to further the dictates of client autonomy within
the spirit of the adversary system," 8 the dominant model of lawyering struggles
to make sense of legislative dictates that put "duties" on professional bodies to
101. David A. Demers, "The Continuum of Professionalism" (1998-1999) 28 Stetson L. Rev.
319 at 319. See also Daniel J. Pope & Stephanie J. Kim, "Client Perjury: Should a Lawyer
Defend the System or the Client?" (1997) 64 Def. Counsel J. 447 at 453.
102. See e.g. LSUC, Rules, supra note 10, r. 4.01(2).
103. For various code-based and legislative statements regarding the profession's obligations to the
"public interest," see generally Part III.B of this article.
104. See e.g. Rondelv. Worsley, [1967] 1 Q.B. 443, Lord Denning M.R. (C.A.), (following n. 27
and accompanying text), aff d [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (H.L.). Similarly, the former Chief Justice
of Ontario-when speaking on the topic of "advocacy in the 21st century"---emphasized the
various competing interests to which advocates must be faithful: "Lawyers are not solely
professional advocates or 'hired guns'. And while they do not surrender their free speech
rights upon admission to the bar, they are also officers of the court with fundamental
obligations to uphold the integrity of the judicial process, both inside and outside the
courtroom. It is the duty of counsel to be faithful both to their client and to the.
administration of justice." Hon. R. Roy McMurtry, "Role of the Courts and Counsel in
Justice" (The Advocates' Society Spring Symposium 2000, Advocacy in the 21" Century, 6
June 2000), online: <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/role.htm>.
105. See e.g. CBA, Code,.supra note 27. See also LSUC, Rules, supra note 10, r. 4.01(2)(b).
106. See e.g. LSUC, Rules, ibid., r. 1.03(1)(a).
107. Freedman, supra note 64 at 9.
108. See e.g. Pepper, supra note 71. See further Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41.
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act in the "public interest," "to maintain and advance the cause of justice and
the rule of law," and "to act so as to facilitate access to justice.""0 9 To address
these ethical challenges and duties, an alternative model has developed.110 This
alternative model is the second "school" contemplated by Atkinson in his
discussion of the "fundamental question of professional ethics." 1
III. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF PROFESSIONALISM
The basic point of departure for critiques of the dominant model, as intimated
by Atkinson's question, is the opportunity for, or obligation on, lawyers to be
guided by extra-legal norms, such as morality, religion, politics, and custom,
when representing their clients. Further, critics of the dominant model have a
much more expansive view of the kinds of interests that must be considered when
determining the appropriate course of action in a given situation. As with the
dominant model of professionalism, there are equally compelling arguments in
support of these alternative models sounding in principle, policy, and practice." 2
A. PRINCIPLE
The starting point for this discussion 'eally comes from the foundational
premise that lawyers, as self-regulated professionals, have been given the
opportunity and responsibility to act not just in the interests of their clients
but, more fundamentally, in furtherance of the "public interest."" 3 Therefore,
109. See Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 4.2.
110. But see Randal N.M. Graham, Legal Ethics: Theories, Cases, and Professional Regulation
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004) at 103-28.
111. Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41 and 57.
112. Although there clearly are differences between alternative models, as a general matter they
maintain more similarities than differences. For a useful discussion of some of the leading
alternative models, their similarities and differences, see Dolovich, supra note 76 at 1646-49,
1664-65, in which she writes that "[i]n the main" a number of alternative models share "the
view that ethical lawyering requires the exercise of discretion by individual lawyers, who
must judge for themselves in any given situation what justice requires and act accordingly"
(at 1648). For a useful discussion on the distinctions between the American and Canadian
perspectives on legal ethics, see Woolley, "Integrity in Zealousness," supra note 83.
113. For example, according to the Supreme Court of Canada,
[c]learly, a major objective of the (New Brunswick Law Society] Act is to create a self-regulating
professional body with the authority to set and maintain professional standards of practice. This, in
turn, requires that the Law Society perform its paramount role of protecting the interests of the
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in addition to the interests of the client, the advocate must take into
consideration a number of other interests (as required by his or her status as a
member of the legal profession) including those of other clients, himself or
herself, opposing lawyers, the court, and other sectors of society included in the
overall administration of justice.'14
A number of visions are contemplated by the various attempts to develop
an alternative model, including descriptions of lawyers as "officers of justice"
who are "morally reflective individuals";1 descriptions of the lawyer's role as a
"moral activist[], ' '.. 6 requiring a 'profession-wide emphasis on greater moral
sensitivity and self-awareness among attorneys";.. and descriptions of the
lawyer's professional duty as requiring "reflective judgment" to "further
justice" ' and provide "moral perspective" 19 through the development of
"critical morality." 2 ' All of these descriptions taken together, in response to
Atkinson's question, 2 ' essentially require lawyers "to accept personal
public...'The privilege of self-government is granted to professional organizations only in exchange
or, and to assist in, protecting the public interest with respect to the services concerned...'
Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247 at para. 36 [references omitted].
114. For a recent discussion of some of these competing interests and some of the challenges that
come with seeking to balance them, see Farrow, "The Negotiator-As-Professional," supra
note 15. See also Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41; Wasserstrom, "Legal
Education," supra note 37; Rhode, "Persistent Questions," supra note 3; and Beverley G.
Smith, Professional Conductfor Lauyers and Judges, 3d ed. (Fredericton: Maritime Law Book,
2007) c. 1.
115. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 17, 67. See also Paul A. Teschner, "Lawyer
Morality" (1970) 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 789.
116. Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 79 at 160.
117. Vischer, supra note 34 at 271.
118. Simon, "Ethical Discretion," supra note 76 at 1083. Similarly, Simon articulates the
normative underpinning of this model as a "'seek justice"' maxim. Ibid. at 1090. See further
William H. Simon, "'Thinking Like a Lawyer' about Ethical Questions" (1998) 27 Hofstra
L. Rev. 1.
119. Vischer, supra note 34 at 225.
120. Allan C. Hutchinson, "Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society: Between Professional and
Personal" (1997) 5 Int'l J. Legal Prof. 175 at 187 [Hutchinson, "Legal Ethics for a
Fragmented Society"]. More recently see generally chapter 3 in Hutchinson, Legal Ethics,
supra note 8.
121. Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41.
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responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional actions." '122 In the
"extreme" form, the lawyer should "avoid doing harm" by refusing to act if the
lawyer thinks that the outcome of "winning" would be on balance a "bad
thing" or "socially unfortunate," in spite of the fact that "the client will pay"
and that the lawyer "wouldn't be doing anything that came close to violating
the canons of professional ethics." '123
As can be seen, when calculating what amounts to furthering the cause of
justice or the public interest, these alternative accounts invariably rely on some
sense of individual morality. They do not allow the lawyer morally to "insulat[e]"
herself "within her role" from the justice or injustice of the client's cause.12
These various accounts take seriously the lawyer's personal morality or sense of
justice in the spirit of balancing, and indeed privileging, the interests of the
public over those of the client, particularly when those interests collide. Beyond
that, however, these views do not mandate one sense of what counts as morality.
What is encouraged is not a shared sense of morality that provides "bright-line
answers," but rather "ethically reflective analysis and commitments."
125
Further, even if we thought that the dominant model provided a viable
vision of the lawyer's role, that vision can only, in its best light, amount to a
fiction. Because lawyering is a human exercise, it will always be accomplished
through the lens of the human experience. According to Mark Orkin, "A
lawyer cannot, more than any other man, keep his personal conscience and his
professional conscience in separate pockets ... it cannot be seriously denied that
every lawyer is, in some measure, the keeper of his client's conscience."
126
Robert Vischer has more recently developed this line of thought. He believes
122. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 66-67. See also Hutchinson, Legal Ethics, supra
note 8 at 50-58, 212; Allan C. Hutchinson, "Calgary and Everything After: A Postmodern
Re-vision of Lawyering" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 768; and David Luban, "Integrity: Its
Causes and Cures" (2003) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279. Similarly, according to Atkinson's
description of the moral activist, the lawyer cannot be "neutral professionally toward what
she opposes personally." Ibid at 191.
123. Duncan Kennedy, "The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes" (1987) 18
Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1157 at 1159 [Kennedy, "The Responsibility of Lawyers"].
124. See Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41 at 190-91.
125. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 71. See infra notes 174 and 178 and
accompanying text.
126. Mark M. Orkin, Legal Ethics: A Study of Professional Conduct (Toronto: Cartwright & Sons,
1957) at 264-65 [footnotes omitted].
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that a lawyer's own "moral convictions" are "inexorably part" of the "attorney-
client dialogue," whether "acknowledged by the attorney or not. 127 If lawyers
fail to acknowledge the morality that "holds sway" over their professional
deliberation, that morality is "forced into the background, where it is not
susceptible to exploration by the client."128 As such, the dominant model of
lawyering is a fiction and is "not a harmless fiction, for it facilitates the
tendency of clientsto equate legality with permissibility." 
29
Finally, even if lawyers were able to compartmentalize their moral deliberation
in the spirit of robust role-differentiated behaviour, by so doing, they impoverish
the possibilities of giving legally and ethically sound advice to their clients.3
and run the risk of paying a significant personal and social price. According to
Wasserstrom, the "nature of professions ... makes the role of professional a
difficult one to shed ... In important respects, one's professional role becomes
and is one's dominant role ... This is at a minimum a heavy price to pay for the
professions as we know them in our culture, and especially so for lawyers." '131
B. POLICY
As with the dominant model of lawyering, there are equally-if not more-
powerful policy statements supporting the alternative approaches to
professionalism, including numerous code-based and legislative statements.
From the perspective of professional codes of conduct, a good starting point in
Canada is the "President's Message" that introduces the CBA's Code, which
provides that "[s]tandards of professional ethics form the backdrop for
everything lawyers do."'32 Further, the "Preface" to the CBA's Code provides
that its "primary concern" is "the protection of the public interest."33 Similarly,
in Ontario, the Law Society Act provides that, "[i]n carrying out its functions,
127. Vischer, supra note 34 at 228-29.
128. Ibid. at 229.
129. Ibid.
130. See e.g. Hutchinson, "Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society," supra note 120 at 187-88.
131. Wasserstrom, "Lawyers as Professionals," supra note 20 at 15. See also MacKenzie, supra
note 63 at 1-8.
132. Brian A. Tabor, "President's Message" (March 2006) in CBA, Code, supra note 27 at v
[Tabor, "President's Message").
133. CBA Code, ibid. at ix.
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duties and powers under this Act," the LSUC has a "duty" to "maintain and
advance the cause of justice and the rule of law"; "facilitate access to justice";
and "protect the public interest....1134
There are many different code statements that support this loose notion of
acting in the "public interest." For example, the CBA's Code, in its provisions
governing the lawyer's relationship to the "administration of justice," provides
that "the lawyer should not hesitate to speak out against an injustice. ' 135 In
Ontario, the LSUC's Rules dictate that, when acting as an advocate, "a lawyer
shall not ... knowingly assist or permit the client to do anything that the lawyer
considers to be ... dishonourable....136 Similar international examples also
obtain. For example, according to the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional
Responsibility of the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA), a lawyer
"should be temperate and dignified, and refrain from all illegal and morally
reprehensible conduct. 1 37 As well, the Basic Rules on the Duties of Practicing
Attorneys (Basic Rules) of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA)
provide that the "mission of an attorney is to protect fundamental human
rights and realize social justice.' '1 38
Providing these justice-seeking policy statements, although important, is
not the end of the matter. For the alternative models of professionalism, they
form just the beginning of the conversation, since the codes fail to define what
constitutes an "injustice," "dishonourable" or "morally reprehensible" conduct,
or even "social justice." Often lawyers are left to their own moral devices to
understand these provisions and their application to particular courses of action
134. Law Society Act, supra note 109, s. 4.2. Similarly, in Alberta, the Preface to the LSA's Code
provides that the "legal profession is largely self-governing and is therefore impressed with
special responsibilities. For example, its rules and regulations must be cast in the public
interest, and its members have an obligation to seek observance of those rules on an
individual and collective basis." Supra note 88, Preface.
135. CBA, Code, supra note 27, c. XIII, commentary 3.
136. LSUC, Rules, supra note 10, r. 4.01(2)(b). See similarly ibid., r. 1.03(l)(a) (which is not
limited to the lawyer's role as advocate).
137. NYSBA, New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, EC 1-5, online:
<http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttorneys/Professional Standards
forAttorneys/LawyersCodeDec2807.pdf>.
138. JFBA, Basic Rules (preliminary provision, adopted 10 November 2004) at 1, online:
<http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/aboutlpdf/basic-rules.pdf>.
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(thus creating contested devices, understandings, and applications13 ). For this
reason, it is important to keep notions of ethics and professionalism distinct.
There is also therefore a need for what Rhode contemplates as a lawyer's ability
for "ethically reflective analysis." '
There are numerous policy-based statements recognizing the need for
individual deliberation by lawyers. In Canada, for example, the Law Society of
Alberta acknowledges that its professional "rules and regulations ... cannot
exhaustively cover all situations that may confront a lawyer, who may find it
necessary to also consider legislation relating to lawyers, other legislation, or
general moral principles in determining an appropriate course of action."'' In
Ontario, the LSUC regards the notion of a "competent lawyer" as someone
"who has and applies relevant skills, attributes, and values... 12 Further,
Ontario lawyers-"particularly in-house counsel"-acting for organizations in
the post-Enron era "may guide organizations to act in ways that are legal,
ethical, reputable, and consistent with the organization's responsibilities to its
constituents and to the public.""4 3 By separating what amounts to "legal" and
"ethical," clearly the LSUC contemplates professionalism as an advisory exercise
that involves more than simply the consideration of client conduct that is
"legal." 4 ' In the United States, the ABA acknowledges that its Model Rules "do
not ... exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer,
for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules."' 5
Similarly, in Japan, even when a lawyer "endeavor[s] to realize his or her client's
legitimate interest," that lawyer "shall follow the dictates of his or her conscience."' 6
It is possible, although often a stretch, to harmonize the above code-based
goals (of encouraging lawyers to speak out against an injustice and to avoid
139. See Part PV.C, below.
140. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 71.
141. LSAI Code, supra note 88, Preface [emphasis added].
142. LSUC, Rules, supra note 10, r. 2.01(1) [emphasis added].
143. Ibid., r. 2.02(5.2),'commentary [emphasis added].
144. See similarly ibid., r. 4.01(2)(b): "When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall not ...
knowingly assist or permit the client to do anything that the lawyer considers to be dishonest
or dishonourable...." For my discussion on a potential objection regarding the distinction
between "legal" and "ethical," see supra note 59.
1'45. ABA, Model Rules, supra note 23 at para. 16 [emphasis added].
146. JFBA, Basic Rules, supra note 138, r. 21 [emphasis added].
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dishonourable or morally reprehensible conduct) with the underlying
institutionally-based and autonomy-seeking policies of the dominant model of
professionalism. However, even if we accept that level of harmonization, it is
not credibly feasible to harmonize the tools provided by the codes for realizing
those challenging goals-"general moral principles," "relevant ... values,"
"act[ing] in ways that are ... ethical," "moral and ethical considerations," the
lawyer's "conscience," et cetera.Y 7 -with the amoral "hired gun" principles
underlying the traditional dominant model. Indeed, it is even difficult to
harmonize these code-based tools with the policy-based tools used by the
dominant model and found in the very same codes.
As I will discuss shortly, although difficult to reconcile with other
seemingly conflicting code provisions that are traditionally relied upon by
proponents of the dominant model,"8 the code provisions, discussed above,
open up alternative ways of lawyering that do make meaningful room for the
relevance of a lawyer's "moral principles" and "conscience," all of which take
seriously interests beyond those of the client. We now appear to have two viable
visions of the lawyer actively grounded in two different but equally robust sets
of code-based policy statements.
C. PRACTICE
Notwithstanding the earlier discussion of the dominant role of the zealous
advocate in today's practice, there is clear and convincing evidence that a
lawyer's personal morality actively influences how lawyers practise law. Further




moral choices are made by lawyers throughout the project of law. As David
Tanovich has argued, "over the last fifteen years, we have been engaged in an
ongoing process of role morality reconstruction. Under this reconstructed
institutional role, an ethic of client-centred zealous advocacy has slowly begun
to be replaced with a justice-seeking ethic that seeks to give effect to law's
ambition." 5 Starting from their first days in law school, students are making
more informed choices about what law schools to attend, what courses to take,
147. See supra notes 141-43 and 145-46.
148. See Part lI.C, above, for various dominant model code provisions.
149. Vischer, supra note 34 at 228-29.
150. Tanovich, supra note 25 at 273.
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and what areas of law to pursue. Lawyers are actively making decisions about
which clients to take, how to represent those clients, and how to withdraw their
services when a client relationship breaks down (in terms of trust, respect, et
cetera)."' All of these practical trends accord with my own anecdotally-based
assessments of lawyers and law students over the past eighteen years of studying,
practising, and teaching law. They also accord, as David Tanovich argues, with
the conclusions of an empirical study of Ontario lawyers by Margaret Ann
Wilkinson, Christa Walker, and Peter Mercer."5 2 This study-although far
from concluding that lawyers had moved from the dominant to an alternative
sensibility of lawyering-"amply demonstrates that ... lawyers are preoccupied
with the constant tensions of specific solicitor-client relationships and the
lawyer's overall obligations to society." 15 3
D. COMPETING PROFESSIONALISMS
At the moment, then, students of professionalism are currently left with two
broad and competing menu choices when thinking about how best to
understand legal ethics, or put differently, how best to approach Atkinson's
"fundamental question of professional ethics.""' On the one hand-speaking
from principle, policy, and practice-there is still robust life in the spirits of the
dominant model. On the other hand, a self-conscious moral sensibility of
lawyering is certainly not a stranger to the modern vision of professionalism. In
fact, on each of these three indicators, there is powerful and persuasive support
for those who believe that they are not guided only by law's limits in the
exercise of their lawyering duties.
151. In these circumstances, decisions to withdraw need not be based simply on legal or financial
conflicts, but can also be based on conflicts of a personal nature. See e.g. LSUC, Rules, supra
note 10, r. 2.04. See also relevant competence principles, r. 2.01. For a general discussion of
the alternative model playing itself out in practice, see ibid.
152. Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, "Testing Theory and Debunking
Stereotypes: Lawyers' Views On The Practice Of Law" (2005) 18 Can. J.L. & Jur. 165, cited in
Tanovich, supra note 25 at n. 13-15 and accompanying text. See also Peter Mercer, Margaret
Ann Wilkinson & Terra Strong, "The Practice of Ethical Precepts: Dissecting Decision-Making
By Lawyers" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. &Jur. 141, cited in Tanovich, ibid. at 270, n. 13.
153. Wilkinson etal., ibid. at 190, cited in Tanovich, ibid. at n. 15 and accompanying text.
154. Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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In my view, the principles and policies that support the alternative model
fit more naturally with the modern realities of lawyering. They tend to support
Tanovich's observations regarding the shift toward a "justice-seeking ethic" over
the past fifteen years."' 5 Moreover, they fit more naturally with an early version
of the CBA's guiding ethics principles on a lawyer's duty: "to promote the
interests of the State, serve the cause of justice, maintain the authority and
dignity of the Courts, be faithful to his clients, candid and courteous in his
intercourse with his fell6ws and true to himself"'' 6 This vision nicely fits with
the aspirations of my students when asked if they would prefer a vision of
professionalism that allowed for the opportunity to maintain a meaningful
sense and space for "self.'
57
However, even if Tanovich is correct in that the "zealous advocacy" model
is slowly being replaced by a "justice-seeking ethic," we are clearly a long way
from shedding the "names, battle slogans, and costumes"'58 of the dominant
ideology. According to David Luban, one of the most vocal supporters of an
alternative vision of lawyering, although those who subscribe to an alternative
vision of professionalism represent "a substantial minority of the legal
profession, it is a minority view nonetheless""'59 So why do we continue to be so
powerfully influenced by the dominant trend of professionalism?
Several possible answers obtain. First, there is the argument of tradition.
There is no doubt that the dominant model enjoys the weight and sway of a
long history and tradition. One only needs to look as far as the earlier
discussion of Lord Brougham's vision of a lawyer 6 ' to find support for this
tradition-based argument.' However, as is typically the case with tradition- (or
precedent-) based arguments, without some other compelling reason, these
arguments tend to be nothing more than self-serving tautologies; the model is
155. Tanovich, supra note 25 at 273.
156. CBA, Canons of Legal Ethics (Ottawa: CBA, 1920) cited in Orkin, supra note 126 at 13
[emphasis added]. For a current articulation of these Canons, see e.g. Law Society of British
Columbia, Professional Conduct Handbook, c. 1 (in force 1 January 1992).
157. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
158. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
159. David Luban, "The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective" (1995) 63 Geo.Wash. L. Rev. 955 at 955 [Luban, "Social Responsibilities of Lawyers"].
160. Supra note 68 and accompanying text.
161. Compare Tanovich, supra note 25 at 272, n. 19 and accompanying text.
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persuasive, because the model has been persuasive for a long time. Without
something more, this line of argument fails to account for the model's
continued dominance, particularly in the face of viable alternative options.
Second, perhaps the dominant model continues its hegemonic prominence
because it is simply more compelling. Given its autonomy-seeking focus and its
one-size-fits-all foundation (one of its "dangerously attractive" features162), there
is no need for uncomfortable ethical deliberation on the part of individual
lawyers. The dominant model champions its amoral ability to be applied to all
lawyers and all lawyering situations. It thereby criticizes the alternative models
for overplaying the relevance or supremacy of the lawyer's individual moral
choices or preferences (that risk usurping the ethical autonomy of the lawyer's
client) while underplaying the institutional value of the lawyer in the adversary
system. However, the problem with these arguments and justifications for the
dominant model's continued prominence is that, as was demonstrated above,
163
there is compelling principle, policy, and practice-based evidence that in my
view fatally challenges its assumptions and foundations.
A third and related basis for the model's continued hegemoriy stems from
the power politics and economics of the lawyering process. Law has increasingly
become a competitive business driven by complex needs of powerful clients. As
Gavin MacKenzie comments, "Lawyers practise in a market economy, and the
highest bidders in such an economy are wealthy and often powerful. 1 6' Having
lawyers who will zealously do their bidding obviously serves the interests of
clients. It also, however, often serves the interests of lawyers. Personally (and
politically) it allows lawyers to sidestep the messy business of'moralizing and
taking personal responsibility for the deeds of their clients. 165 Economically, it
allows lawyers to charge significant fees in exchange for adopting a morally role-
differentiated professional position.
There is no doubt that this power-politics basis provides a significant
justification for the persistence of the dominant model that views the lawyer-
client relationship as symbiotic. However, in addition to the principle, policy,
and practice examples that challenge the basis of these power politics, 66 there is
162. Farrow, "The Negotiator-as-Professional," supra note 15 at 398.
163. See Part II, above.
164. MacKenzie, supra note 63 at 1-7. See also lacobucci, supra note 36 at 860.
165. Discussed further in Part ILA-B, above.
166. See Part III, above.
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also no direct evidence supporting the basis of this argument, which is-at its
root-that lawyers are exclusively willing pawns of their clients, or as
MacKenzie describes, willing to "fiddle on the corners where clients throw
coins."167 In my view, seeing lawyers in such a weak light cheapens not only the
office of the lawyer but also the reality of the practice.168 Further, as MacKenzie
comments, "[t]here is no evidence that lawyers who act for the wealthy and
powerful are any more or less ethical than are those who act for the poor and
powerless."169 Similarly, as Hutchinson remarks, "[l]aw may well be a business,
but that does not necessarily entail an unethical or unprofessional approach to
conducting that business." ' These comments certainly accord with my own
experience in the practice of law, in which complex and financially costly client
demand often went hand-in-hand with a high degree of self-reflective ethical
conduct. 71 They also accord with increasing demands (often by wealthy,
powerful clients) for ethical practices from legal counsel.'72 So while certainly a
significant answer, I do not think that power politics provides the ultimate
answer for the dominant model's continued persistence.
The fourth and most persuasive reason for the continued prominence of
the dominant model comes not from the strength of that model but rather
from a weakness in the way that the alternative models have, to date, been
presented. Specifically, the alternative models are often framed in terms of the
"moral perspective," "moral lawyering," or "the good lawyer."' 73 Even though
proponents of these models sometimes see things differently,17 4 these labels tend
to connote some shared or required understanding of what counts as "moral" or
"good." It has taken the Enlightenment three hundred years to move this
understanding from the realm of the family and the personal to a collective
understanding of autonomy and rights at the public level of civil society. It is
167. MacKenzie, supra note 63 at 1-7.
168. See Part III.C, above.
169. MacKenzie, supra note 63 at 1-7.
170. Allan C. Hutchinson, "Who Are 'Clients'? (And Why it Matters)" (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev.
411 at 430 [Hutchinson, "Who Are 'Clients'?"].
171. For a brief discussion of my former practice experience, see e.g. supra note 40.
172. See McClintock, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
174. See e.g. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 71.
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an understanding that cannot, by most accounts of liberalism in a pluralistic
and complex society, be defended.17 To avoid this apparent trap, the dominant
vision of the lawyer-"aiming not to inject her own vision of the good into the
representation, but simply to pursue the client's vision of the good through the
maximization of the client's legal rights"'76 (based on classic Rawlsian political
liberalism that prefers the right over the good"'7 )-nicely sidesteps a search for
shared values and visions of the good life through role-morality. As such, it
fosters the Enlightenment project of individual freedom and autonomy.
Even if we are persuaded by, for example, Rhode's answer to the problem
of shared morality,"7 8 these "intolerant""7 9 labels, by their very nature, tend to
characterize the "other" side as being the opposite of a "good" lawyer, a "moral"
lawyer, or a "just" lawyer, which the "other" dominant view rejects. For example,
when looking for a shared conception of the public interest, Tanovich argues
that it must at least require "lawyers to act in the pursuit of justice."'80 In turn,
justice for Tanovich "can be defined, for purposes of the lawyering process, as
the correct resolution of legal disputes or problems in a fair, responsible, and non-
discriminatory manner."'.' This definition of justice-seeking lawyering, or any of
these alternative "moral" or "good"-based labels for that matter, are not wrong.
In fact, by and large they are right. The problem is that these definitions and
labels could be (and are) equally and credibly claimed by both sides to describe
their lawyering projects. Lawyers on both sides think of themselves as "morally
175. For leading accounts of this current theory of liberalism, see e.g. John Rawls, Political
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice,
rev. ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999). See also Atkinson, "A Dissenter's
Commentary," supra note 25 at 343. For a concise and powerful critique of Rawlsian
liberalism-primarily animated by communitarian arguments that make space for a
modern sense of the "good" being prior to the "right," see e.g. Michael J. Sandel, "Political
Liberalism," Book Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls, (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1765. See also Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search ofa Public
Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
176. Vischer, supra note 34 at 227.
177. Supra note 175.
178. See Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 71.
179. See Atkinson, "A Dissenter's Commentary," supra note 25 at 343.
180. Tanovich, supra note 25 at 284.
181. Ibid. [citation omitted] [emphasis in original].
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reflective individuals,"'82 "better people,"' 8 3 "better lawyers,"'.8 and "correct." '85
They just approach these labels from very different perspectives.
And so we return to Atkinson with two competing and intractable stories.
One story, by "anxiously conjur[ing] ... up the spirits of the past,"86 continues
to create "a world after its own image."'87 The other story, a modern story that
challenges this old world image, rejects much of its "names, battle slogans, and
costumes." 88 In so doing, however, it has failed-at the moment of
"revolutionizing" itself and of "creating something entirely new""-to replace
the "time-honoured disguise and ... borrowed language." 98 What is needed is a
new, persuasive lens through which to see the world not in the service of "all
the dead generations," '' but in the service of the "living"'92 in "this society"'93
and in the service of "the world of our children." 9 ' What is needed is a story of
professionalism that captures the energy and positive attributes of both sides of
this debate. What is needed is a story of professionalism that is sustainable.
IV. SUSTAINABLE PROFESSIONALISM
A key aspect of the problem is that the two stories, on their face, disagree
about how to evaluate what counts as the "right" course of action in a given
circumstance. Their positions on this fundamental question'95 compete. If we
continue to assert these competing positions without uncovering the interests
that underlie their positions-unless we find some common ground or more
182. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 67.
183. Dolovich, supra note 76 at 1649.
184. Ibid.
185. Tanovich, supra note 25 at 284 [citation omitted].
186. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
187. See Marx & Engels, "Communist Manifesto," supra note 30 at 477.





193. See Mayer, supra note 2.
194. Ibid.
195. Atkinson, "Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41.
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specifically, a persuasive lens through which to see this potential common
ground-we will maintain this gridlock. 16 By uncovering the underlying
interests at stake in each of the two versions, we will start to see who and
what we need to address and to protect in order to develop a story of
professionalism that addresses all (or at least as many as possible) of those
underlying interests. We will find common ground on which. to build a
theory of professionalism that is (as far as possible). acceptable to, or
sustainable for, both sides.
A. UNDERLYING INTERESTS
So what are those underlying interests? For the dominant model, the client
maintains the ultimate interest. More specifically, this model preferences the
client's ability to maximize his or her autonomy and rights within the broad
parameters of what counts as legal, and free from the moralizing of the
advising lawyer. For the alternative visions, some version of "justice" or the
"public interest" is the primary interest at stake. Again, this model specifically
cares about the interests of a number of stakeholders-the client, the lawyer,
the judge, the other side, and the public (present and future)-who, taken
together, describe the interests of justice or what is thought of as the public
interest. Under this model, discovering and balancing these interests actively
engages the lawyer's own moral opinions and preferences in the dialogue.
The primary points of disagreement between these approaches are the
number of relevant stakeholders (client versus client and others) and the relevance
of a lawyer's own moral opinions (vis- -vis the client's chosen course of legal
conduct). Otherwise, both sides seem to agree on the basic justice-seeking
premise of the lawyering exercise. We can recast this discussion, taking account
of both the shared and competing interests, through a lens of sustainability.
Before developing a concept of sustainability, I should note that my vision
of professionalism does not treat one side or the other as morally superior or
inferior. This exercise does not need to be an antagonistic zero-sum game.
Rather, we must recast our discussion in terms of being able to address,
196. This process of uncovering "interests," in the face of competing "positions," is an application
of interest-based negotiation theory. For a discussion of this theory, see Colleen M. Hanycz,
"Introduction to the Negotiation Process Model" in Hanycz, Farrow & Zemans, supra note
15, c. 3.
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protect, and accommodate as many of the underlying interests of the two
competing visions as possible.
B. SUSTAINABILITY
My approach re-directs much of the positive energy and progressive ideas of the
competing models of professionalism through a more persuasive, sustainable
lens. This approach stems from my frustration from hearing students and
lawyers say to me countless times that a new way of thinking about
professionalism would be a good idea in theory, but is just not sustainable in
reality.197 This article therefore answers those skeptics by proposing a form of
professionalism that is normatively sound, is descriptively accurate, and
provides the basis for broad-based buy-in from as many justice-seeking
stakeholders as possible. At the moment, neither the dominant nor the
alternative model satisfies all three requirements.
Interestingly, but for a handful of references to several useful but general
social science initiatives looking at the role and future of professionalism,198
there is little meaningful discussion of "sustainability" in the academic literature
on legal ethics.'99 It is not a mantra that theories of professionalism have self-
consciously embraced."'
As a general matter, sustainability has come to be primarily identified with
three particular approaches: "sustainability as optimal living resource
exploitation"; "sustainability as respect for ecological limits"; and "sustainability
as sustainable development."2"' While all three approaches characterize the
typical use of the concept in modern legal parlance, they do not preclude other,
more general uses of the idea. Nor do they preclude a wide range of
197. See e.g. supra notes 40 and 43 and accompanying text.
198. See e.g. John Craig, ed., Production Values: Futures for Professionalism (London: Demos,
2006), online: Careers Scotland <http:/lwww.careers-scotland.org.uklnmsruntime/
saveasdialog.asp?lID=9439&slD=1 164>.
199. I realize that proving a negative is not an easy task. For purposes of this article, it is also not a
necessary task.
200. However, as is discussed in Part IV.B.4, below, several theories of professionalism do provide
some useful groundwork for this approach.
201. See Stepan Wood, "Sustainabiliry in International Law," UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life
Support Systems (Oxford: EOLSS Publishers, 2003) 1 at 1-2, online: <http://osgoode.
yorku.ca/osgmedia.nsf/research/woodstepan>. I am grateful to Stepan Wood and Hugh
Benevides for helpful background comments on the concept of sustainability.
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stakeholders from engaging in discussions of sustainability broadly defined. For
example, according to Stepan Wood,
[s]ustainability has emerged as one of the defining preoccupations of human affairs
at the opening 'of the twenty-first century. It has proven to be simultaneously as
alluring and as challenging to international lawyers as it has to scientists, politicians,
businesspeople and others. It provides a powerful symbol around which diverse
interests can converge, but at the same time it eludes concrete definition, encompasses
conflicting agendas and promises to generate continuing debate and controversy.
202
To my mind, the legal profession provides a new terrain for "continuing
debate" about the utility of sustainability, broadly defined. There are many
definitions of the word "sustain": for example, to "uphold the validity or
rightfulness of' or to "keep (a person or community ... etc.) from failing or
giving way.12 3  Further, "sustainable" was defined (in the context of
development) in the foundational "Brundtland Report" as meeting "the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.I2M For my purpose, a lens of sustainability provides a
"powerful symbol around which diverse interests can converge, "205
"encompasses conflicting agendas," 216 "promises to generate continuing debate
and controversy,"207 and is open to some normative notion of "rightfulness" 28
in the eyes of a "person or community. 20 9 Also important is the consideration
of both current and future interests.
210
202. Ibid. at 2.
203. William Little, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 3d ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973), s.v. "sustain" [OED].
204. World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), "Our
Common Future" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), transmitted to U.N. General
Assembly as annex to Development and International Co-operation: Environment, UN GAOR,
42d Sess., Annex Agenda Item 82(e), UN Doc. A/42/427 (1987), c. 2 at para. 1, online:
United Nations <http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm> (cited to UN Doc. A/42/427)
[Brundtland Report].
205. Wood, supra note 201 at 2.
206. Ibid.
207. Ibid.
208. OED, supra note 203.
209. Ibid.
210. "Brundtland Report," supra note 204. For a useful judicial treatment of the term
"sustainability," including the importance of non-economic "social values," see Tsilhqotin
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From before, we saw that the primary conflicting agendas involved those
solely of the client as compared to those of a broader range of voices."' Further,
the theories of professionalism disagree as to the relevance or prominence of a
lawyer's individual moral opinions vis- -vis a client's legal course of action.212
Therefore, a useful lens of sustainability must take into account a broad range
of these competing interests, which I have organized into four main groups:
client interests, lawyer interests, ethical and professional interests (of lawyers
and the profession), and the public interest.213 It is important to note that the
following discussion purports to be neither comprehensive regarding an
individual interest nor complete regarding the totality of interests. Rather, what
follows is a brief treatment of a sampling of some fundamental, perhaps
competing, interests.21
1. CLIENT INTERESTS
The dominant model of professionalism described above21 protects and fosters
meaningful space for the interests of clients, particularly powerful and wealthy
clients, typically to the exclusion of all others. As we saw, based on principle,
policy, and practice-based arguments, any notion of professionalism.must make
robust space for the realization of a client's legal interests in a free and
democratic society.
Nation v. British Columbia (2007), [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 112 at paras. 1295-1301, D.H.
Vickers J. (S.C.).
211. See Part IV.A, above.
212. Ibid.
213. I am adapting this framework from earlier comments I made on the topic of professionalism
(particularly in the context of professionalism from a negotiator's perspective). See Farrow,
"The Negotiator-as-Professional," supra note 15 at 376-77.
214. Because I am developing a general theory of sustainable professionalism in this article, what
follows is a sampling of interests that could apply in a range of practice contexts (e.g., corporate,
family, real estate, and criminal). It would also be useful-and should be an issue for further
research-to look at this theory of sustainability within the context of specific practice areas.
One area of particular interest (given its prevalence) and potential challenge, would be the
corporate law context, in which clients often wield significant wealth, power and influence vis-
-vis the interests of their lawyers. See MacKenzie, supra note 63 at 1-8 (and accompanying
text). As MacKenzie notes, in this world of increased commercialism within the practice of law,
the "pressure to condone unethical or even unlawful but lucrative acts can be overwhelming." I
am grateful to Allan Hutchinson for comments regarding this line of inquiry.
215. See Part II, above.
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At the outset, nothing in a theory of sustainability seeks to reject the
importance of a client's legal interests. In fact, as Hutchinson-a primary
proponent of an alternative approach to professionalism-argues, a "directive to
lawyers to take responsibility for what they do (and do not do) ought not to be
viewed as an excuse to ignore the needs of clients... ."21 Further, "lawyers will
not foist their own values on the client, nor will they work with clients in ways
that offend their own moral convictions. Initiated and sustained in this way, the
lawyer-client relationship will be mutually respectful and engaged."21 Clients
must play a central role in any calculus of a sustained theory of professionalism.218
This makes sense as a descriptive matter. It also makes sense as a freedom-
seeking normative matter. Important, however, is the realization that the
conversation does not end here. If we are to make sense of the further principle,
policy, and practice-based arguments that so powerfully animate the alternative
models of professionalism,"' we need to take seriously and make room for some
of the other (sometimes competing) interests that are at stake in this discussion.
2. LAWYER INTERESTS
As a starting point, there are numerous demands of the lawyering role that
engage several self-interested notions of professionalism. First, there are
pecuniary interests. Lawyers want to get paid and paid fairly for the hard
work that they do and for the services that they provide. Therefore, a
sustainable notion of professionalism must take into account the ability of
lawyers to make a fair living. As the Honourable Frank Iacobucci comments,
to the "extent that lawyers ... are financially successful it is often because they
effectively and efficiently serve the needs of their clients, and that is an
admirable thing.'22
Further, non-pecuniary interests of the lawyer will also play a prominent
role in a sustainable notion of professionalism. Lawyers should expect to
maintain a meaningful ability to pursue activities and interests that make for a
216. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics, supra note 8 at 213.
217. Ibid. at 214 [emphasis added].
218. A robust theory of client representation must also recognize the variety and diversity of
clients and client interests. For a usefu treatment of this issue, see e.g. Hutchinson, "Who
Are 'Clients'?", supra note 170.
219. See Part III, above.
220. lacobucci, supra note 36 at 863.
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full life not only as lawyers but also as members of society. Time at work, time
at home, time with friends, and time engaging in social and political affairs
should all be realizable goals of a sustainable professionalism. A sustainable
notion of professionalism must avoid "slavishly adhering to billable hours and
client getting at the cost of overlooking the quality of the work offered by
lawyers or their contributions to the profession and the community both in
legal and non-legal spheres.
22
'
There already exists a rich and growing body of literature that deals with
professional issues such as professionalism and work-life balance.222  A
sustainable discourse of professionalism must seriously grapple with those
demands and that literature. As argued above, 22 doing so does not amount to
ignoring the interests of clients. It also does not guarantee or mandate a certain
lifestyle or work ethic. This discourse calls for the balancing of client interests
with other interests, including-as contemplated by various canons of
professional conduct 22 -those of the lawyer. By so doing, it creates more
meaningful' space for the interests of the lawyer that the dominant model, by
constantly foregrounding the interests of the client, invariably backgrounds.
Under a sustainable model, lawyers have more choice in the calculus of how to
proceed in a given context.
3. ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS fOF LAWYERS AND THE PROFESSION)
Numerous ethical and professional interests are at play when mapping out a
sustainable vision of professionalism. 2" The principles and policies that animate
the alternative models provide numerous robust bases for requiring that
ethical and professional considerations be a meaningful part of a sustainable
vision of professionalism.226
In addition to seeing the lawyer's role as one that should pursue "social
justice" by avoiding "dishonourable" or "morally reprehensible conduct, '"227
221. Ibid.
222. See e.g. Farrow, "A Profession, Not a Life," supra note 5.
223. See Part I, above.
224. See e.g. supra note 156 and accompanying text.
225. I recognize that some of these issues are equally of interest to the public, and could therefore
be categorized in the fourth-"public interest"-subheading in this part.
226. See Part Ill.A-B, above.
227. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
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several other ethical or professional interests must form part of a sustainable
discourse of professionalism. As a starting point, for this discourse to include
the many different faces that make up the bar today, we must first recognize
and celebrate the diversity of that bar. We must reject stories of lawyers who,
collectively, are members of a homogenized and unified profession. Why? First,
as a descriptive matter, such stories are not reflective of reality. As numerous
commentators have noticed, those who practice law make up an increasingly
diverse social, political, economic, cultural, and gender-based background. 28
Second, as an economic matter, lawyers need increasingly to make sense of
diversity obligations because clients are demanding that they do so. Market-
based diversity incentives, in the form of diversity checklist programs, are a
further reason why diversity matters in the context of understanding modern
notions of professionalism.
29
Third, as a normative matter, such stories act to exclude a wide range of
people who are or want to be practising law in diverse and meaningful ways in
society. As Constance Backhouse has articulated, traditional stories of the
practice of law have often resorted to ideas of "professionalism" that "exercise
power and exclusion based on gender, race, class and religion." 23" As such, the
228. For discussions of this contested complexity of the profession, see e.g. H.W. Arthurs, "The
Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?" (1994-1995) 33 Alta.
L. Rev. 800 at 805; Matasar, supra note 23 at 986. See also Hutchinson, "Legal Ethics for a
Fragmented Society," supra note 120; Harry W. Arthurs, Richard Weisman & Frederick H.
Zemans, "Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism" in Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C.
Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World, vol. 1 (Berkeley, Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1988) at 123; David A.A. Stager with Harry W. Arthurs,
Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 321; Hazard, Jr. &
Rhode, The Legal Profession, supra note 76, c. 3; and David B. Wilkins, "Identities and Roles:
Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility" (1998) 57 Md. L. Rev. 1502.
229. See e.g. McClintock, supra note 14.
230. Constance Backhouse, "Gender and Race in the Construction of 'Legal Professionalism':
Historical Perspectives" (Paper presented to the Chief Justice of Ontario's Advisory
Committee on Professionalism, First Colloquium on the Legal Profession, 20 October 2003)
at 2 [unpublished], online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/constance-backhouse- gender-
andrace.pdf>. See also Wilkins, supra note 228. See further Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw,
eds., Women in the World's Legal Professions (Portland: Hart, 2003); Joan Brockman, Gender
in the Legal Profession: Fitting or Breaking the Mould (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2001); and Sheila McIntyre & Elizabeth Sheehy, eds., Callingfor Change:
Women, Law, and the Legal Profession (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2006).
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Honourable Bertha Wilson, in her seminal report, Touchstones for Change, to
the CBA on equality and diversity, forcefully articulated the premise that a
"starting point for a discussion on the need for change must be the recognition
that gender equality is a fundamental legal norm... . The law in Canada now
demands adherence to the equality principle. The legal profession should show
leadership by adopting equality norms as its own.""23 Clearly for a theory of
professionalism to be sustainable for the diverse communities that practise law,
it must speak in terms that honour that diversity, not in terms that marginalize
it. As former Governor General Adrienne Clarkson argues:
[The profession] should be more of a mirror of society-and the society we've
become-if it is to have a truer perception of the public interest and a more self-
conscious awareness of its role and responsibility in the creation of our new citizenry.
And this starts with greater equity and equality in the legal profession itself.232
A greater understanding and openness to diversity in our notions of
professionalism will provide a more welcome and meaningful home for more
lawyers. It will also push the profession's understanding of and participation in
a public interest that truly reflects the reality of our general pluralistic and
globalized civil societies."' Further, however, it will also recognize the
231. Report of the CBA Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, Touchstones for
Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: CBA, 1993) at 17. To date, only
limited success in furthering the bar's commitment to a robust sense of equality has
obtained. See e.g. Chief Justice of Ontario Advisory Committee on Professionalism,
"Elements of Professionalism" (October 2001, rev. December 2001 and June 2002), online:
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/definingprofessoct2001revjune2002.pdf>. See further
Rosemary Cairns Way, "Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility: Incorporating
Equality" (2002) 25 Dal. L.J. 27.
232. Adrienne Clarkson, "Speech on'the Occasion of an Honorary Doctorate of Laws Degree
from The Law Society of Upper Canada" (27 February 2003) [unpublished], online:
Governor General of Canada <http://www.gg.ca/media/doc.asp?lang=e&DoclD=1091>.
233. For code-based recognition of the importance of diversity in local communities, see e.g.
LSUC, Rules, supra note 10, r. 1.03(1)(b). For recent comments on the modern make-up of
civil society, see e.g. Unnati Gandhi, "Facing up to a new identity" The Globe and Mail (3
April 2008) Al; Anthony Reinhart, "A nation of newcomers" The Globe and Mail (5
December 2007) Al. For general background discussions, see Leopold Posposil, "Legal
Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems" in Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Perspective
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971) at 97; Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism" (1988) 22
Law & Soc'y Rev. 869; Franz von Benda-Beckmann, "Comment on Merry" (1988) 22 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 897; David Held et al., Global Tranoiormations: Politics, Economics and Culture
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diversity of individual lawyers, with diverse moral perspectives, which will in
turn assist with the charge that by allowing lawyers to moralize about their
clients' causes, we will require some sense of a shared morality. 234 Andrew
Kaufman states,
I do not think it all bad that the kind of advice clients get depends to some extent on
the chance of whom they choose or have chosen for them as lawyers... . In some
cases there are costs to leaving things to chance. But so are there costs in trying to
force very different lawyers with very different sensibilities into one attitudinal mold
for nearly all situations.
235
Celebrating a multiplicity of voices at the bar also assists with the "last
lawyer in town" objection, which is often raised by dominant model theorists as
a potentially fatal concern with alternative models of professionalism. As the
argument goes, if all lawyers moralize about the causes of their clients, there is a
good chance that clients with unpopular causes will not be able to find lawyers
to take their cases. 236 The question then becomes even more difficult if you-as
a moral lawyer-find yourself to be the last lawyer in town. Do you take the
case? My first response to this question is: "show me evidence establishing this
concern as a recurring problem and I will then start to worry about it." 237 Along
the lines of "hard cases make bad law," it just has not been our typical experience
that unpopular causes have systematically gone unrepresented. Second, if that
unlikely scenario were to materialize, a balancing of competing interests-those
of the client, the lawyer, and the state to provide for an adversarial system that
is open to all comers-might well lead on balance, under a sustainable theory of
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) at 1-28; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Nature
and Types of Globalization(s)" in TowardA New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization,
And Emancipation, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002) at 177. For early comments of
mine on the topic, see e.g. Trevor C.W. Farrow, "Reviewing Globalization: Three
Competing Stories, Two Emerging Themes, and How Law Schools Can and Must
Participate" (2003) 13 Meikei L. Rev. 176, trans. into Japanese by M. Kuwahara, (2003) 44
Aichigakuin L. Rev. 29, republished (2004) 5 J. Centre Int'l Stud. 1.
234. See e.g. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, supra note 66 at 71.
235. Andrew L. Kaufman, "A Commentary on Pepper's 'The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role"'
(1986) 11 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 651 at 655.
236. For commentary raising this type of concern, see e.g. Dash, supra note 13 at 220 ("If a lawyer
says my moral judgments don't allow me to support this particular person, even though I know
he has a legal case, who will represent that person?"). See also Rhode, supra note 66 at 57; Ibid.
237. 1 am anecdotally aware that such cases do exist, particularly in more rural contexts.
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professionalism,238 to the lawyer taking the case. Third, even taking this concern
at face value as a real concern (which some people do239), celebrating a pluralism
of voices at the bar goes a long way to mitigating this risk. With a multitude of
moral backgrounds and perspectives, a diverse bar becomes more welcoming to
clients with diverse legal needs.
Other professional issues of interest to a theory of sustainable
professionalism relate to some of the realities and responsibilities of practising
lawyers, often seen in the context of litigation. 211 One issue in particular that
strongly militates against a robust view of adversarialism as the basis for a
persuasive model of professionalism is that, as Tanovich has recognized, at least
in the context of the civil dispute resolution system, almost all cases settle.4 1
The dominant model typically takes as its paradigmatic lawyer the zealous
advocate, most often as conceptualized in the litigation context. However, "the
overwhelming preponderance' of what lawyers do 'involves negotiating with
others,' 24 2 which is invariably located outside of the courtroom. As such, a
professionalism that is sustainable in the eyes of all lawyers, not just of those
who act in the 2 per cent or so of cases that go to trial, must take into account
the varied practice contexts of all non-courtroom lawyering experiences. 3
4. PUBLIC INTEREST
Flowing from the third group is this fourth group of interests that, taken
together, focus specifically on the public interest. Again, there is a vast array of
238. Developed further, below, in Part IV.C.
239. See e.g. Kaufman, supra note 235.
240. In addition to the issue of adversarialism, discussed in this section, another practice-related
issue of interest to a sustainable understanding of professionalism is the issue of civility. See
e.g. Michael Code, "Counsel's Duty of Civility: An Essential Component of Fair Trials and
an Effective Justice System" (2007) 11 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 97. But see Alice Woolley, "Does
Civility Matter?" (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 175.
241. See Tanovich, supra note 25 at 282 [citation omitted]. For an earlier discussion of mine on
settlement rates, see e.g. Trevor C.W. Farrow, "Dispute Resolution, Access to Justice and
Legal Education" (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 741 at 749, n. 43.
242. Farrow, "The Negotiator-as-Professional," supra note 15 at 373 [footnote omitted].
243. For a recent discussion of the varied roles of modern lawyers, specifically including their role
as settlement counsel, see Julie Macfarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming
the Practice of Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008). For a review of the Macfarlane book, see
Andrew Pirie, (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 203.
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interests that could be captured as part of this discussion. A notion of
sustainable professionalism must maintain meaningful room for protection of
the public interest, and in particular the robust and aspirational principle- and
policy-based statements that animate the alternative models of professionalism
in the spirit of protecting the public interest.2 4 A notion of professionalism that
does not acknowledge that "[s]tandards of professional ethics form the
backdrop for everything lawyers do, ' M" and further, that a "primary concern" of
the profession is "the protection of the public interest,"2" will not be
sustainable on any calculus that makes good on the bargain with society to
protect the public interest in return for the privilege of self-regulation." 7
As a starting point, the alternative model commentator who comes closest
-to articulating a self-conscious theory of sustainable professionalism-primarily
in the spirit of the typical notions of sustainability that focus on living
resources, ecology and development 2"--is David Luban.2" In his discussion of
the "social responsibility of lawyers," Luban argues that lawyers have a
responsibility in the project of "solving collective action problems.""25 He
contemplates the notion of a "socially responsible" lawyer as a professional who
"forbear[s] from collectively harmful action.""2 1 Further, he defines this notion
of "collective responsibility" as "the responsibility we bear not to foul our own
nest, to maintain the very systems that sustain us."252 Echoing the green
movement, Luban asks, "[w] hen will we reach the point of understanding that
to evade our social responsibilities is little more than suicide?" 5 3
Far from deferring to client interests that, while legal, may not be
sustainable from the long-term perspective of the environment, Luban
contemplates the lawyer's role as one of an active moral agent who takes
244. See Parts IILA-B, above.
245. Tabor, "President's Message," supra note 132.
246. CBA, Code, supra note 27 at ix.
247. Discussed in supra note 103 and accompanying text.
248. Wood, supra note 201 at 1-4.
249. Luban, "Social Responsibilities of Lawyers," supra note 159 at 955.
250. Ibid.
251. Ibid. at 963.
252. Ibid. at 982.
253. Ibid. at 983.
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seriously the responsibility to do good in the world. Luban's perspective is a
self-consciously moral perspective. Of course what amounts to doing "good" in
a given case may still be a contested discussion. And that is acceptable because
having a discussion, rather than simply deferring to a client's interests, is a
significant part of the exercise of a theory of sustainable professionalism. By
allowing for this discussion, Luban's morally reflective approach enables
multiple interests to be considered and balanced. It is also a perspective that
takes seriously professional code dictates not only to avoid "injustice" and
"dishonourable" or "morally reprehensible" conduct, but also to pursue courses
of conduct that foster "social justice. 25 4
Luban is not alone on this issue. Other commentators also advocate a
theory of professionalism that makes meaningful space for lawyers pursuing just
causes with their legal skills. Duncan Kennedy, for example, makes no apologies
for his view that lawyers "should avoid doing harm" with their "lawyer skills."
25
Hutchinson, although leaving significant space for client autonomy in his
alternative vision of professionalism, takes seriously the centrality of the lawyer's
role by encouraging a sensibility of "critical morality" that asks: "What interests
am I going to spend my life serving as a lawyer?" 256 Each of these accounts fits
with Mayer's ultimate challenge to the bar, namely, that lawyers should
demand that their efforts on behalf of their clients also amount to "a plus for ...
society and for the world of our children. 2 7 A sustainable notion of
professionalism-one that makes good on the promise of public interest
protection-therefore needs to take seriously these alternative accounts. And in
case this all seems far from what should reasonably be expected of the practising
bar, we should remember that calls to "maintain and advance the cause of
justice and the rule of law" and to "protect the public interest" come not only
from these aspirational interpretations of professional principles, but also from
foundational legislative dictates that establish our very professional existence.5 8
They also, at least according to Tanovich, are already being realized.259
254. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
255. Kennedy, "The Responsibility of Lawyers," supra note 123 at 1161.
256. Hutchinson, "Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society," supra note 120 at 187.
257. Mayer, supra note 2.
258. See Law Society Act, supra note 109, s. 4.2.
259. See Tanovich, supra note 25.
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In addition to thinking about the substance of what our clients do under
the rules of the legal system, there is a threshold discussion of whether or not
clients can access the system in the first place. Protecting the public interest
requires a theory of professionalism that contemplates a bar that is working
toward mea*ningful access to the system for all members of society. For example,
as Ontario's Law Society Act provides, the LSUC has a "duty" to "facilitate
access to justice."26 The dominant model of professionalism, by focusing on
the courtroom battlefield of the zealous advocate, proceeds on the assumption
that clients have access to that battlefield in the first place. We know, however,
that such ready access is not a reality for most people.261 Access to justice in this
country (in the form of access to lawyers and access to the system),262 and
indeed around the world, is only a fiction. As such, a sustainable
professionalism must not proceed on an assumption of full access. Rather, we
must start at the problematic level of today's access realities and develop a
theory of professionalism that seeks to be creative and successful vis-h-vis the
bar's obligation to "facilitate access to justice."263
C. BALANCE AND CONTEXT
So where does this leave us? From a review of the competing principle, policy,
and practice-based arguments that animate the dominant and alternative
models of professionalism,26 and trying to make sense of these various complex,
contextual, and sometimes competing interests-reminiscent of some of the
interests set out at the beginning of this article26 -what remains is a challenge
260. See Law Society Act, supra note 109, s. 4.2.
261. See e.g. Ab Currie, "A National Survey of the Civil Justice Problems of Low-and
Moderate-Income Canadians: Incidence and Patterns" (2006) 13 Int'l J. Legal Prof. 217.
262. For a broader discussion of access to justice in Canada, see Roderick A. Macdonald, "Access
to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions" in Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart &
Frederick H. Zemans, eds., Access to Justice for a New Century - The Way Forward (Toronto:
LSUC, 2005) at 19 and Marc Galanter, "Access to Justice as a Moving Frontier" at 147.
263. Law Society Act, supra note 109, s. 4.2. For a useful account of the bar's responsibilities to
foster access to justice (which has influenced my thinking on the connections between access
to justice and professionalism), see Richard Devlin, "Breach of Contract?: The New
Economy, Access to Justice and the Ethical Responsibilities of the Legal Profession" (2002)
25 Dal. L.J. 335. See also Hutchinson, Legal Ethics, supra note 8 at 85-88.
264. See Parts II and III, above.
265. See supra notes 3-14, 32, and accompanying text.
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that neither the dominant nor the alternative model has fully overcome. As I
argued earlier,266 both sides must learn to think and speak in terms that are
sustainable to a wide range of voices and interests. The dominant model,
through its narrow focus primarily on one interest "in all the world,"'2 67 misses a
variety of other relevant people and interests. The alternative model, on the
other hand-through its typical focus on the "good lawyer"-has been seen to
be unrealistic in practice, at least in light of the continued use of "time-
honoured disguise[s] and ... borrowed language." 268
This theory of sustainable professionalism addresses the gridlock created by
these competing notions of professionalism. It purports to do so by harnessing
both the energy and optimism of the alternative models as well as the tenacity
of the dominant model. Even more importantly, it self-consciously identifies
the myriad interests that are at stake in the context-those of the client,
lawyer, profession, and public-and draws them into a theory of
professionalism that is sustainable.
By moving beyond the centrality of the client's interest as championed by
the dominant model, instantly we open ourselves up to competing and
potentially irreconcilable interests. This theory of sustainable professionalism.
takes seriously the complex and pluralistic landscapes of lawyers, clients, and
the public. But in order to have a chance of buy-in from those broad-based
stakeholders, we need to live in the world of those complexities, not in a world
of fictional simplicity. As Backhouse reminds us, doing otherwise simply
perpetuates exclusion.269  Such exclusion, in turn, fails to develop a
professionalism that is sustainable on any calculus. We also need to live in a
world that is not afraid of those complexities. At times conflict will be
unavoidable. And when it does occur, a sustainable theory of professionalism
will seek to balance and respect as many interests as possible. For example,
allowing for client autonomy and meaningful space for moral deliberation by a
lawyer is not necessarily a mutually exclusive exercise. In fact, as Hutchinson
argues, it is an exercise that can in fact be mutually beneficial: "To provide
sound professional judgment, it is necessary to resort to a well-honed and
266. See Part I1D, above.
267. Trial of Queen Caroline, supra note 68.
268. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
269. Backhouse, supra note 230.
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mature sense of moral acuity. "270 Further, failing to. develop "bridges" between
the "professional role" and the "dictates of a personal morality" will
"impoverish both professional and- personal pursuits. 271
At times, however, the conflict will be irreconcilable. The legal demands of
a client retainer may collide head-on with the dictates of a lawyer's own
personal moral code. For example, what if a rich, speculative, private land
developer wishes to negotiate a deal with a slum landlord over the purchase of a
fully functioning, low-income rental facility that currently houses eighty
subsistence-income-level families, in favour of its demolition and.replacement
with a high-end, multi-use condo facility that would house eight high-income
families?272 Would you take the retainer? How would you advise the developer?
Would it make a difference if you knew that alternative housing arrangements,
given the current rental market, were not immediately available to those other
families? Alternatively, what if the CEO of a large privately-held downsizing
transnational security firm came to you and asked you to negotiate a deal in
private that would result in the termination of all employees of the Muslim
faith, based on your client's unfounded occupational requirement theory that
these employees, while good people, simply pose too much of a reputational
and security risk (in terms of attacks against security officers in the field) and
are therefore too costly to the firm?273 What course of action would avoid an
"injustice," would avoid "dishonourable" or "morally reprehensible" conduct,
and would promote a generally accepted notion of "social justice"?..
The dominant model and alternative models have not been able to find
common ground on these sorts of questions. The dominant model provides
270. Hutchinson, "Legal Ethics for a Fragmented Society," supra note 120 at 187-88.
271. Ibid.
272. See Farrow, "The Negotiator-as-Professional," supra note 15 at 388, n. 62. This hypothetical
case, and my use of it in previous commentary and in class discussions, has been directly
influenced by Duncan Kennedy's initial development of a similar scenario. See Kennedy,
"The Responsibility of Lawyers," supra note 123 at 1161.
273. See Farrow, "Negotiator-as-Professional," ibid. See similarly Rob Atkinson's treatment of
Lord Darlington's instructions to his butler (Mr. Stevens) to "let ... go" all the "Jews on the
house staff' in the interests of the "safety and well-being" of his guests, based on Kazuo
Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), in Atkinson,
"Perverted Professionalism," supra note 41 at 181-84.
274. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
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that if the lawyer decides to accept the retainer (which is itself, although not
required, an act that is encouraged by the dominant model), he or she must
background his or her own moral views and proceed to effect the client's
legally permitted instructions. Based on anecdotal experience, that is not a
personally satisfying, acceptable, and therefore sustainable approach for many
students and lawyers.27
The alternative models, by typically asking the question "what does justice
require?" in a given situation, immediately open the door to contextual
analysis.276 By so doing, competing interests can be balanced and, in the end, be
prioritized on a calculus of what a lawyer thinks is a "good" course of conduct.
This is what Rhode contemplates as a lawyer's ability of "ethically reflective
analysis." 7 As they currently stand, however, the alternative models-by
perceiving themselves as taking the moral (justice-seeking) high ground and by
casting the lawyering exercise into a normative hierarchy-have alienated both
members of the dominant model and closet members of the alternative models
who fail to see room for a theory of professionalism that makes space for the
institutional practicalities and realities of the practice of law.
By seeking to normalize these competing interests and discourses, through
an exercise of interest identification and rationalization, the theory of sustainable
professionalism recasts these interests into a broad collective of inputs. These
inputs are the landscape of what amounts to the "real world" of the modern
lawyering project. Seeing competing interests in this light normalizes them. It
also forces any theory of professionalism to take them into account in order to
be sustainable in the eyes of its various interested stakeholders.
If a lawyer chooses to represent the "rich, speculative, private land
developer," '278 then-pursuant to a theory of sustainable professionalism-he or
she is doing so because, based on an interest-based calculus that includes a broad
range of voices (including the client, the lawyer, and the public), the lawyer
thinks it is a "good" thing to do, not because of the feeling that he or she "has
to do it." The lawyer may choose to do so because he or she agrees with the
275. See Farrow, "The Negotiator-as-Professional," supra note 15 at 388, n. 62 and
accompanying text.
276. See e.g. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 66 at 67; Tanovich, supra note 25 at 302.
277. Rhode, Interests ofJustice, ibid. at 71.
278. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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client's motivations. Alternatively, the lawyer may be persuaded by the principle
of client autonomy that underlies the dominant model of professionalism.279 In
the further alternative, the lawyer may choose to take on the client but then try
hard to persuade the client to pursue a different course of action. The lawyer's
motivations may be that he or she disagrees with the goals of the retainer and
seeks to change the client's mind. The lawyer may simply think that it is not
the kind of work that he or she wants to do. Or the lawyer may think that it is
not in the public interest, or that it is not "[]honourable," "moral[]," or in the
pursuit of "social justice."28 Regardless, -the goal is to foster deliberation both
for the lawyer and between the client and the lawyer, in the spirit of enabling a
sustained and engaged discussion that takes seriously a variety of potentially
competing interests. This is not simply an exercise in client autonomy or an
exercise in moral superiority. It is an exercise in real world, sustainable lawyering.
Some may challenge this vision as simply restating the basic premise of the
alternative models. There clearly are many similarities, and from the outset I
have acknowledged my debt to these alternative models.281 My point is not to
reject the alternative models but rather to draw on their energy and optimism.
However, as I have also argued, there has been a consistent lack of buy-in to
these models. This model of sustainable professionalism takes, seriously the
merits of those alternative approaches. At the same time it adequately
responds to, often resists, but in some cases benefits from, the power of the
dominant model. In the end, by accessing and being accessible to multiple
norms, models, and interests, this model of sustainable professionalism does a
better job of being "normatively sound," being "descriptively accurate," and
providing the premise "for broad-based buy-in from as many justice-seeking
stakeholders as possible." '282
D. LEGAL EDUCATION
Before concluding, there is a further element of this discussion, and that is its
connection to legal education. There are many moments within the profession
279. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. See further supra notes 252 and 272 and
accompanying text.
281. See e.g. supra notes 46, 154-56 and accompanying text. See also Part IV.B, above.
282. From Part IV.B, above. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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at which the possibility of change can occur, including at law schools, bar
admission programs, mentoring initiatives, continuing education courses,
judicial speeches and judgments, discipline rulings, bencher directives, and in
professional rules and commentaries. Of course external sources for change also
obtain, including legislative limits on self-regulation, public opinion, client
demands, and others. However, it is at the initial stage of the professional
experience that a sensibility of openness to alternative discourses is most
palpable, possible, and important.
How we see ourselves individually as lawyers and how we see ourselves
collectively as a profession are foundational questions that must be addressed in
legal education. We need to realize and make use of the fact that law schools
retain significant power "to structure the moral perspectives of those who
experience it."283 As Richard Wasserstrom argues, the question of "what is the
nature of the good lawyer?" is potentially "one of the central questions, if not
the central question, of legal education.""28 Similarly, according to Deborah
Rhode, "[l]aw schools cannot be value-neutral on questions of value. One of
their most crucial functions is to force a focus on the way that legal structures
function, or fail to function, for the have-nots. Another is to equip and inspire
students to contribute to the public good and to reflect more deeply on what
that means in professional contexts."285
As discussed earlier286 and elsewhere,287 there continues to be an alarming
disconnect between what students think is right in the world and what students
think they are going to be required to do to be "good" lawyers. This is
particularly problematic, for no other reason than that it assumes, at the outset,
that the role-differentiated amoral advocate championed by the dominant
model is the only viable model in the context of the "real world" of lawyering.
If after a full exposure to and cdnsideration of alternative models a student
prefers the dominant model of lawyering as one that should animate his or her
283. Dolovich, supra note 76 at 1670.
284. Wasserstrom, "Legal Education," supra note 37 at 155.
285. Rhode, "Persistent Questions," supra note 3 at 659-60. See generally Rhode, Interests of
Justice, supra note 66, c. 7.
286. See e.g. supra notes 40, 42, and accompanying text.
287. See e.g. Farrow, "Negotiator-as-Professional," supra note 15 at 388, n. 62 and
accompanying text; Kennedy, supra note 6 at 87 (discussed further at supra note 43 and
accompanying text).
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own practice vision, then so be it. However, at the moment, those alternative
models apparently do not stand a chance. All of the aspirational language that
animates the principle, policy, and practice-based arguments of the alternative
models-i.e statutory and code-based requirements designed to promote "the
cause of justice and the rule of law"288-are missing from the ultimate calculus
of what counts as a "good" lawyer. And here we see how the dominant model
perpetuates itself, notwithstanding the desires of many students and lawyers-
and even some clients289-to engage in a deliberative exercise of "creating
something entirely new." 29' A modern theory of professionalism must make
room for these competing principle, policy, and practice-based arguments in a
way that is accessible to the broad range of relevant stakeholders, so as to
dethrone the dominant vision of professionalism in favour of a professionalism
that is more sustainable.
V. CONCLUSION
As Adam Dodek comments, with some notable exceptions, scholarship
generally addressing legal ethics and professionalism in Canada is still in its
early days. 291 Further, Tanovich comments: "[u]nfortunately, we have only had
few attempts in Canada to set out systematically a ... theory of ethical
lawyering. ' 29 2 This article seeks to add to those attempts.
From the start I have been troubled by the fact that, notwithstanding these
powerful arguments of the alternative models there continues to be a remaking
of history in the image of the past that favours the time-honoured but
increasingly fictional vision of the dominant model of lawyering. It is a
descriptively inaccurate model. It is a morally problematic model. It is an
exclusionary model. It does not sit well with many current and future members
of the bar. On that basis I have argued that it is not a sustainable model.
Further, this resigned pose of un-sustainability is particularly pernicious in the
288. See Law Society Act, supra note 109, s. 4.2.
289. See e.g. McClintock, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
290. See Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire," supra note 1 at 595.
291. See Dodek, "Canadian Legal Ethics," supra note 8. See also Michael Proulx & David Layton,
Ethics and the Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: Irwin, 2001) at 7-10.
292. See Tanovich, supra note 25 at 309 [citation omitted].
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context of law school. In its place, I have argued for a model of
professionalism-seen through a lens of sustainability-that makes descriptive
and normative sense of our complex modern legal world. I also hope, by so
doing, to participate actively in the changing dynamic of law schools with a
view to providing sustainable alternatives to the dominant stories of old. We
need to recast our understandings of professionalism by way of a new lawyering
sensibility, which is not of moral superiority (although that may, in the end, be
the case), but of individual and collective sustainability. By moving away from a
client-centered discussion and toward a discussion thai takes seriously a
plurality of voices and preferences, including but not exclusively those of the
client, we will find many more takers for this theory of sustainable
professionalism as a viable discourse for the practice of law. Given what is at
stake, we cannot be agnostic to this exercise. Matasar argues:
Lawyers ... must ... be the driving force behind ethical and moral change. It is not
enough to bump along, oblivious of the questionable tactics the profession engages
in under the name of advocacy, zealous representation, or the lawyerly posturing.
Doing so diminishes us as individuals and collectively gives the profession a bad
name. No, our strategies must be different. We must be disobedient when it matters
most; we must be reformers, constantly seeking a more moral profession; and we
must be willing to withdraw.
293
Staying the course of the dominant model will not allow us to fully realize
our potential to be "the driving force behind ethical and moral change."29  We
need a sustainable alternative model to facilitate change. As Socrates
commented in the Republic, the question of how we should live our lives-or in
this context how we should view ourselves as professionals-is "no light
matter." 295 This is because, as Mayer argues, in all likelihood "this society ...
and the world of our children" 29 6 will largely depend on how we view ourselves
as professionals.
293. Matasar, supra note 23 at 986.
294. Ibid.
295. Plato, trans. by jowett, supra note 50 at Bk. I, 352d.
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